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1CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
On October 28, 1921 the Oregon Supreme Court handed down the first in a pair
of cases which touched on the degree of discretion patients had in making medical
decisions for themselves under Oregon's workmen's compensation laws. Conrad Grant,
the plaintiff in the case, worked as a riveter for the Columbia River Shipbuilding
Company. In the course of performing his occupational duties, Grant slipped, struck his
knee against a piece of steel, and threw it out. After several months of treatment, Grant's
knee was no better: approximately twice per month, a piece of cartilage slipped out, and
his knee became swollen and locked. During these times, Grant was unable to work, and
the State Industrial Accident Commission (SIAC) was compelled to make disability
payments to cover his lost time at work.
Under a 1917 act oflegislature, SIAC was authorized to compel its patients to
undergo "medical or surgical treatment as the Commission deems reasonably essential to
promote his recovery ... ,,1 Using its powers under this act, the commission and its
physicians attempted to force Grant to undergo a tricky operation to sew the cartilage into
place. Worried about the surgery's outcome, Grant sued the commission. On appeal, the
Oregon Supreme Court sided with Grant, constructing the 1917 statute broadly to hold
that the commission's physicians' advice was only advisory in the context of potentially-
dangerous operations. The trial court jury had the power to determine the reasonableness
Oregon. House. House Bill No. 408. Twenty-Ninth Legislative Session, 1917.
2of SIAC's decisions, as it had when it decided the case in Grant's favor prior to appeal by
the commission.2
Less than one year later, the court delivered its ruling in the second case of the
pau. The plaintiff in this second case, logger Wincent [sic] Smith, suffered several
injuries when a log fell on his head and shoulder, cut his head, sprained his shoulder, and
bruised his right foot. 3 According to his physician, Coos County contract physician
George E. Dix, Smith was a "rather irritable patient.,,4 The patient constantly disobeyed
Dix's orders, periodically removed his bandages, and when he determined that his
condition had not improved, left the hospital against without Dix's permission. After
leaving the hospital, Smith traveled to Portland and underwent a shoulder operation
performed by Dr. Samuel Slocum.
As a worker covered under the industrial accident system, Smith believed that
SIAC would cover his medical and surgical bills. The commission disagreed: Smith was
covered under a contract between his employer, the Smith-Powers Logging Company,
and Dr. George E. Dix. By the terms of that contract, Smith was required to obtain his
medical care exclusively from Dr. Dix. Smith's attorney, Harry G. Hoy, attempted to
sway the case in Smith's favor using the recently-established precedent from Grant's case.
2 Oregon. Supreme Court. Oregon Reports. Grant v. State Industrial Accident
Commission.
3 Oregon. Supreme Court. 563 Oregon Briefs. Smith v. State Industrial Accident
Commission, Appellant's Abstract of Record, p. 6.
4 Circuit Court of the State of Oregon for the County of Multnomah. Wincent Smith v.
State Industrial Accident Commission. Oral Testimony. Document H-6152, Jan. 20,1922,
p.37. Oregon State Archives.
3When Smith's case came before the court, the judges sided with SIAC; under the
workmen's compensation statutes, the commission had the authority to designate Smith's
physician.s The reasonableness precedent from Grant's case applied merely to refusal of
certain types of treatment, and not to the selection of a physician.
The focus on the patient's discretion in medical decision-making under the
workmen's compensation system in both the Smith and Grant cases was probably no
accident. The two cases occurred in the context of heated legislative battles over the
regulation of contract medicine and hospital associations. The main factor behind
Smith's loss was his coverage under this company's medical service contract with Dr.
Dix. At the time of his injury, and for more than two decades beyond, those state
workers who fell under the workmen's compensation statutes were covered under two
different types of plans. The majority of the workers received their care from an open
panel of commission-approved physicians. An injured worker could choose to visit any
of these doctors, and the doctor would remit the bill to the commission. Approximately
forty percent of workers, however, received their care through medical service contracts
S This is a slightly troublesome point in the court's reasoning. Technically, the Smith-
Powers logging company made the contract with Dr. George Dix. Thus, the
commission's contract with Dr. Dix was only by proxy. Testimony by C.c. Bechtold
before the Legislative Workmen's Compensation Committee of the State of Oregon in
1926 criticized the State Industrial Accident Commission for its proposal that it be
permitted to enter directly into medical service contracts with individual doctors and
hospital associations. If SIAC contracted with Dr. Dix, it was only by proxy through the
Smith-Powers Logging Company. See: Oregon. Legislative Workmen's Compensation
Committee of the State of Oregon. Report o/the Legislative Workmen's Compensation
Committee o/the State o/Oregon, 1927, Oregon State Archives.
4according to Industrial Accident Commissioner William Kirk.6 These contracts were
formed between the employer and either a single doctor or group of doctors, or a hospital
association. Under Oregon's statutes, these workers were restricted to this closed panel-
type system; they were not permitted to choose their physicians as the other sixty percent
of workers did.7
Factual and Historical Background
Sociologist and leading medical historian Paul Starr described three factors that
caused employers to sign medical service contracts. First, physicians were generally
unavailable in the isolated areas which were home to railroad, mining, and lumber camps.
A contract with a physician or hospital association ensured that medical service would be
available when needed. Second, employers sought to limit their legal liability by
providing medical protection. Finally, medical service contracts were intimately tied in
with welfare capitalism.8 The provision of medical service aided employers in spinning
6 Circuit Court of the State of Oregon for the County of Multnomah. Wincent Smith v.
State Industrial Accident Commission. Oral Testimony. Document H-6l52. Jan 20, 1922,
p.66.
7 Open panel plans allow patients to visit any licensed physician. In a closed panel
plan, the patient may only see those physicians with whom the insurer has contracted.
See also: Oregon. State Industrial Accident Commission. Work Accidents in Oregon,
(Salem: [no pUblisher information], 1923; Pierce Williams, The Purchase ofMedical
Care Through Fixed Period Payment (National Bureau of Economic Research, 1932), pp.
77-78. Online. Accessed 04/27/10. http://www.nber.orglbooks/will32-l.
8 Lizabeth Cohen supplements Starr's account nicely in her case study of industrial
workers in Chicago. Welfare capitalism, she argued, achieved several goals. Introducing
ethnicity into her analysis, she showed that welfare capitalism served the important
function of "breaking up ethnic communities in the factory." In this manner, the welfare
5"an elaborate web of affiliations binding them to their companies," in addition to
promoting Americanization of foreign workers. "Medical care," Starr wrote, "functioned
as an element in this strategy of control.,,9
Medical service contracts were usually paid for by employee contributions. Some
plans operated on per diem contributions, but the vast majority of plans seem to have
required workers to pay a fixed fee on a monthly basis, usually between $1.00 and $1.50.
The employer took responsibility for collecting the fees and forwarding them on to the
contract doctor or hospital association. 1o In exchange, the doctor or hospital association
would agree to provide care for a class of medical needs. The contracts usually
differentiated between occupational injuries, and occupational and non-occupational
illnesses. To cover the latter, employers usually levied a surcharge. Health care
providers under the original medical service plans were usually single doctors or small
groups of physicians. Eventually, however, these medical service plans came under the
control of laymen, who subcontracted out for physician labor.
capitalists attempted to promote better relations with individual employers - relations that
would only have been stymied by peer loyalty among workers. In a point more relevant
to the present study, Cohen remarked, "Progressive employers advocated providing for
the welfare of their own workers and communities to keep the state at bay." Welfare
capitalism, including plans like those offered by the hospital associations, promised to
restrain state expansion. See: Lizabeth Cohen, Making a New Deal: Industrial Workers
in Chicago, 1919-1939. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), pp. 167,174,
181.
9 Paul Starr, The Social Transformation ofAmerican Medicine (New York: Basic
Books, 1982).
10 Pierce Williams, The Purchase ofMedical Care Through Fixed Periodic Payment
(National Bureau of Economic Research, 1932), pp. 77-81. Online. Accessed 04/28/10,
http://www.nber.org/books/will32-1.
6The National Hospital Association rapidly became the dominant hospital
association. Originally established in 1906, NHA initially wrote contracts only for
individuals. Beginning in 1909, the association expanded to offer group coverage for
employers. I I At the time that the Oregon Supreme Court considered the Smith and Grant
cases, NHA could claim approximately eighty percent of total hospital association
revenues within the state. 12 As a lay-controlled group, the National Hospital Association
grew to have great influence in the Oregon legislature and the Insurance Commission.
The original medical service contracts were made before coverage for
occupational injuries would become widespread under the workmen's compensation
system. Oregon followed a national trend when voters approved the Workmen's
Compensation Act on referendum from the Oregon legislature on November 4,1913 by a
vote of 67,814 to 28,608. 13 The legislation was originally drafted by a commission of
nine men appointed by Governor Oswald West in 1912. West selected three men each to
represent labor, capital, and the state's taxpayers. The commission's report to the
governor described the conditions affecting the three groups that it represented. An
injured worker's only recourse when he suffered an industrial injury was through the tort
II "History." Oregon Historical Society Research Library, Farwest American Assurance
Records, Mss 2863, Box 1 of 8, Folder 1.
12 Oregon. Insurance Department. Report ofthe Insurance Commissioner for the Year
Ending December 31, 1921 (Salem: State Printing Department, 1922).
13 The State of New York passed the nation's first workmen's compensation statute in
1910. Mississippi was the last state to adopt a compensation law when it did so in 1948.
For information on Oregon's workmen's compensation vote, see: Oregon. Secretary of
State. Blue Book and Official Directory. (Salem: State Printing Department, 1915), p. 145.
7system. Here, he faced complex processes, uncertain results, and bitter outcomes. Ifhe
did win, he paid court fees out of his recovery, and was then forced to split the remainder
a contingency fee-hungry attorney. Employers, too, faced an unenviable situation: they
endured protracted, costly litigation. Such litigation threatened to ruin small-scale
producers. The tort situation also harmed the taxpayer - an "innocent bystander," as the
commission described him. The taxpayer bore the "whole burden of expense incident to
maintaining the machinery of the courts." When a workman failed to recover damages,
the taxpayer often covered the expense of supporting him. Even when the workman won
a substantial recovery, "inexperience or improvidence soon [left] him destitute and
without means of support." These workmen inevitably turned to crime, the commission
c1iamed, and the taxpayers paid for the jails and penitentiaries used to discipline them. 14
The commission's workmen's compensation proposal represented a compromise
among the three groups. IS Under the new system, an administrative agency took over the
role of the court, collected contributions to a workmen's compensation fund from
employers and employees (the employers accounted for the greater share of the
contributions), and dispensed those funds to injured workmen on the basis of well-
defined schedules. The award was small, but certain. Any injury sustained "in and of the
course of employment" was compensable, even when the victim contributed to the
accident through his own negligence. Employers, too, stood to benefit: the system
14 Oregon. State Industrial Accident Commission. Report o/the Commission Appointed
by Governor West to Draft a Compensation Bill. (Salem: State Printing Department,
1914), pp.27-28. Online. Accessed 03/09/09. http://books.google.com.
IS For additional information on workmen's compensation historiography, see Appendix
A.
8stabilized the costs associated with occupational injuries. True, the employer was
required to make regular payments, but he no longer faced high legal fees and the
occasional large verdict that upset his balance sheets. The third party, the taxpayer, made
a concession as well: the legislature was to appropriate approximately one-eighth of the
monies collected annually for the State Industrial Accident Fund. The drafting
commission argued that, in exchange for this concession, the taxpayer would directly
benefit from reduced court costs, and indirectly benefit from the reduction in crime
previously committed by destitute, injured workmen. 16
The workmen's compensation dramatically altered the market for medical
services, but it did not immediately end competing solutions to the industrial accident
problem. Long after 1913, for example, bills introduced in the Oregon legislature
specifically exempted lodge practice. 17 This type of practice, operated by fraternal
benefit societies, served as one of the original protections against the effects of workplace
injuries. The hospital associations, too, refused to be pushed out by the new system, and
quickly adapted to the new conditions. Just shortly following the voters' approval of the
16 Oregon. State Industrial Accident Commission. Report ofthe Commission Appointed
by Governor West to Draft a Compensation Bill, p. 31. See also: Lawrence Friedman
and Jack Ladinsky, "Social Change and the Law ofIndustrial Accidents." Friedman and
Ladinsky identify only two parties to the compromise: capital and labor. The West
Commission's report strongly suggests that workmen's compensation should be regarded
as a three-way compromise. The addition of the taxpayer to the existing interpretation is
particularly crucial, especially because debates over state funding had the potential to
restrict compensation benefits.
17 See, for example: Oregon. House. House Bill No. 287. Thirtieth Legislative Assembly,
1919. This bill exempted fraternal benefit societies from regulations imposed on the
proprietary hospital associations.
9Oregon workmen's compensation system, NHA General Manager C.C. Bechtold
circularized potential clients with a solicitation letter. Workmen's compensation was in
its infancy, Bechtold pointed out, and companies could keep costs lower through a
medical service contract instead of payments directly to SIAC. Furthermore, NHA's plan
offered valuable service beyond what the commission could offer: "This plan of service,"
NHA wrote, "perfectly supplements and fits in with WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION
LAWS and provide a much better protection to the workmen... ,,18 Workmen's
compensation hardly replaced the hospital associations: NHA and the other associations
adapted to the new system, and actually tried to use it to increase annual revenues.
At the same time as hospital association contracts gained popular with companies,
they generated ill will among both organized labor and medicine. Opinion in these
groups was hardly uniform, but where it was expressed, it was usually negative. The
Portland City and County Medical Society, for example, attempted to pass a resolution
concerning contract practice in 1906. The resolution specifically condemned contracts
made between physicians and associations or corporations like NHA, and also lodge
practice. It exempted contracts between individual physicians and companies however,
and contained no enforcement mechanism. The resolution ultimately bogged down when
society member Dr. G.S. Whiteside pointed out that the society represented only half of
300 physicians in Portland. Without an overriding majority of Portland's physicians in
18 C.C. Bechtold, "First Aid to the Injured," [no date - probably 1914], Oregon
Historical Society Research Library, Accession # Mss 2863, vol. 11 1909-1920, page 34.
10
support of the resolution, it would have no legitimacy, and even more importantly, no
. h 19welg t.
The Oregon State Federation of Labor made its stance much clearer. At the
federation's January, 1909 convention in Salem, for example, Delegate J.F Cassidy
complained about the assessment of fees by employers to pay for the medical service
contracts. The employers, Cassidy complained, would not assist while employees were
expected to "go down into their own pockets" to pay for surgical and medical expenses?O
As early as 1914, the State Federation of Labor indicated its support oflegislation
imposing restrictions on the collection of hospital association fees.2I
The antagonism of organized medicine and labor toward contract medicine and
the hospital associations, initially half-hearted or not, raises important questions. What
types of strategies did the Oregon State Medical Society and the Oregon State Federation
of Labor employ against contract doctors and hospital associations? To what extent were
these strategies successful? Why did the strategies succeed or fail? Did the strategies
19 "Medical Societies: Portland City and County Medical Society," Medical Sentinel.
Vol. XIV, No.4, April, 1906, pp. 174-176. For the leading account of medical ethical
objections to contract practice, see: Donald E. Konold, A History ofAmerican Medical
Ethics, 1847-1912 (New York: Book Craftsmen Associates, 1962), pp. 68-75. Konold
treats the medical profession's ethics in the 1920s and 1930s as fairly steady and
consistent, yet provides only a cursory analysis of medical ethics in this period. The
instant paper attempts to fill in the gaps for the 1930s. See: chapter 3.
20 Oregon State Federation of Labor. Proceedings ofthe Sixth Annual Convention ofthe
Oregon State Federation ofLabor (Portland: Multnomah Printing Company, 1909), p. 17.
21 See, for example: Oregon State Federation of Labor. Proceedings ofthe Eleventh
Annual Convention ofthe Oregon State Federation ofLabor (Portland: Multnomah
Printing Co., 1914), p. 19.
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reflect popular public consensus, or simply the imposition of private group prerogatives?
The present paper attempts to offer answers to these questions.
Previous Research and Theoretical Considerations
Lawrence Goldberg and Warren Greenberg penned the main account of the
hospital association issue in Oregon. Their piece served mainly to supplement a
contemporary discussion of the economics of health care: they used their article to argue
for the benefits of a competitive insurance market with real price competition. Thus, the
account left much to be desired as an historical interpretation of the period. Goldberg and
Greenberg did make two useful contributions, however. First, they provided an accurate
chronology of the period, dividing the Oregon State Medical Society's strategy against
the hospital associations into two phases. In the initial phase, Goldberg and Greenberg
argued, the medical societies employed policy statements and alternative society-
sponsored prepaid plans to indirectly limit hospital association activities. The second
phase began around 1941, when the state medical society implemented the Oregon
Physicians' Service, ultimately driving the hospital associations out of the market for
direct care.22 Second, Greenberg and Goldberg did point out the issue of the distinctness
of the medical profession. "Many physicians," they wrote, "believe their profession is
22 Lawrence Goldberg and Warren Greenberg, "Emergence of Physician-Sponsored
Health Insurance: A Historical Perspective," Competition in the Health Care Sector: Past,
Present, and Future, Warren Greenberg, ed. (Germantown, MD: Aspen Systems
Corporation, 1978), pp. 238-244. To be fair to the United States Department of Justice,
the Greenberg and Goldberg periodization was clearly taken from its briefs in the case of
United States v. Oregon State Medical Society.
12
essentially different from any other profession or business because medicine deals
directly with human life.',23 Unfortunately, they failed to bring this issue into their
analysis: a closer reading of both the District and Supreme Court opinions in the case of
United States v. Oregon State Medical Society reveals that medicine's unique
professional status was a factor in organized medicine's ultimate triumph over the
hospital associations.
The Greenberg and Goldberg account leaves a great deal to be desired. By
focusing mainly on the economic aspects of competition between hospital associations
and physicians, they failed to address the role of public rulemaking bodies at all. This
omission is surprising, especially given that Greenberg and Goldberg briefly discussed
the Oregon State Medical Society's selective application of its own rules of medical
ethics in eliminating their commercial rivals. 24 Surely, they did not believe that public
regulations played no role in the conflict? Furthermore, they presented a fairly isolated
portrait of physician activities. In the Greenberg and Goldberg account, the contract
medicine issue was fought out between physicians and hospital associations. The Oregon
State Federation of Labor convention records, however, indicate that labor also sought to
have an active voice in the issue.25
23 Ibid., p. 247.
24 Ibid., pp. 233-238.
25 I should also point out the Goldberg and Greenberg text contains an enormous
number of factual inaccuracies, ranging from incorrect dates to dubious explanations of
the specifics of state laws.
13
Paul Starr offered a far more complex, better-contextualized analysis of the
hospital association issue in Oregon in his landmark text, The Social Transformation of
American Medicine, notwithstanding his reliance on the Goldberg-Greenberg account.
Starr used the Oregon situation as a case study to support his attempt to explain the
"inability of corporate enterprise to insert itself successfully between producer and
consumer in medical care under the economic conditions that prevailed in the early
twentieth century.,,26 According to Starr, three factors converged to favor organized
medicine over its commercial adversaries. First, physicians' cultural authority gave them
a solid base of power. Second, organized medicine gained control over the hospital by
three means: its use of interns and residents in the operation of hospitals; its
encouragement of professionalism among rank and file workers; and its employment of
women who would not challenge male physicians' authority and economic positions in
auxiliary roles. Finally, unions, legislatures, the judiciary, and the public tended to
support physicians against the hospital associations.
Starr's work was an improvement over the Greenberg and Goldberg analysis. He
specifically addressed the importance of the hospital as the new site at which medical
care would be delivered, and discussed its role in introducing divisions into the medical
profession between old-style generalist family practitioners and the emerging specialists.
Starr also suggested that organized medicine did not operate in a vacuum when he argued
that unions, legislatures, the judiciary, and the public played a role in handing victory to
26 Paul Starr, The Social Transformation ofAmerican Medicine (New York: Basic
Books, 1976), p. 217.
14
the medical societies. Unfortunately, he left this as just that: a suggestion. In doing so,
he dramatically oversimplified the situation. First, the Oregon example shows that the
unions were hardly unwavering in their support of the medical societies. In fact, conflict
between the two groups may have played an important role in limiting early attempts at
restraining hospital association activities. Second, Starr's discussion of "the legislature"
was theoretically unsophisticated. Oregon's legislature rarely handed victories to the
anti-hospital association forces during the 1920s. Furthermore, the legislative outcomes
ofthe 1930s that favored the medical society were not so much the product of a unified
legislature, but rather the ability of organized medicine to exploit its control of key
committee assignments. Thus, the legislature did not usually, if ever, speak as a unified
body in opposition to the hospital associations. Instead, individual players used its rules
and procedures to their advantage.
Despite the Oregon State Medical Society's view of itself as a distinct group with
a unique professional status, no nuanced account ofthe hospital association issue can
afford to ignore the general economic and regulatory context within which it was first
debated. In fact, the issue initially arose at the same time that the American economy
underwent a fundamental transformation from what Martin Sklar termed competitive to
"corporate" capitalism.27 Sklar argued that the transition to the corporate capitalist
27 According to Sklar's analysis, competitive capitalism emphasized classical concepts
of free competition and supply side equilibrium. The new corporate capitalism focused
on business cycles and the ability of administered markets to fend off crises. See: Martin
J. Sklar, The Corporate Reconstruction ofAmerican Capitalism, 1890-1916: The Market,
the Law, and Politics (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1988).
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economy resulted from the participation of social and political groups in key intellectual,
legal, and legislative spheres.28
At the heart of the new economy and the public response to it was an issue that
lies at the core of the American political tradition: the supremacy of society over state.
Sklar argued that that the species of "corporate liberalism" that emerged represented a
compromise between extreme positions: regulatory corporate liberalism affirmed
administered markets and allowed the growth of the regulatory state without embracing
either totalistic statism or a minimalist-regulatory approach.29 "Whatever their
incongruities," Sklar wrote, "regulatory laws and administrative practice tended, though
far from consistently, to legitimize and recognize the new corporate order, its form of
property, and its leading underlying assumptions.,,30 Thus, the transformation involved
all classes, who, through their participation in the legislative sphere, played an important
28 With this argument, Sklar attempted to displace the old narrative of the
transformation, which held that the economic changes triggered public response and
reform. Under that narrative, the public did not participate in the creation ofthe new
economy. Its only contribution was the regulatory reaction to it.
29 The policies of Presidents Theodore Roosevelt, Taft, and Wilson represented the
three variants of corporate liberalism in Sklar's account. Roosevelt's statist-tending
corporate liberalism retained private ownership, but subordinated property rights to
private property. Under Taft's minimalist-regulatory approach, public utilities would be
distinguished from the general economy, but no modification of traditional property
rights would occur: instead, the state would use its police power against unfair or
monopolistic practices. Wilson's regulatory corporate liberalism represented a middle
ground between Roosevelt's statism and Taft's minimalism. The regulatory approach
allowed the government to modify property rights in the interest of expanded human
rights.
30 Ibid., p. 17.
16
role in not only reacting to, but also shaping and legitimizing the new economic
conditions.31
Louis Galambos and Joseph Pratt also emphasized public participation in their
analysis of Progressive era and 1920s regulations. In what they termed as the "corporate
commonwealth" that emerged, business was only one factor in public decision-making.
Frequent elections and an array of interest groups attempting to shape public policy led to
a condition of confusion, Galambos and Pratt claimed. Thus, the federal and state
legislatures produced regulatory rules in a piecemeal fashion. Those businesses that were
most successful "in exerting pressure on the legislature and the executive branch" looked
beyond control of markets and developed public relationships departments to influence
the social sphere and the political sphere.32 Victory in the legislature, however, was not
31 According to Sklar, the heterogeneous nature of social classes in the 1890s prevented
them from aligning against one another, avoiding gridlock, and forcing capitalists to
proceed through compromise.
Corporate liberalism, according to some scholars, went hand-in-hand with welfare
capitalism. In his review of the literature on this topic, Meylvn Dubofsky wrote,
"exceptionally class-conscious corporate leaders, aware that reform served their self-
interest better than repression did, replaced the policeman's club with the soft glove of a
more socially conscious welfare capitalism." (Dubofksy, xiv) As Dubofsky noted, this
was primarily the view of the New Left historians on the 1960s. Sklar's currently-
prevailing account departed only slightly from this view, Dubofsky argued. [Melyvn
Dubofsky, The State and Labor in Modern America (Chapel Hill: University of North
Carolina Press, 1994).J
32 Louis Galambos and Joseph Pratt, The Rise o/the Corporate Commonwealth: US
Business and Public Policy in the Twentieth Century (New York: Basic Books, 1988), p.
47.
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necessarily the result oftight control over a local power base, but instead the product of
adept lobbying.33
The public statutes governing the certification and operation of hospital
associations in Oregon were formulated in the new regulatory context that Sklar,
Galambos, and Pratt described. As all three pointed out, however, the regulatory
frameworks ofthe early twentieth century hardly required businesses to give up their
control over private property and their attempts to control private markets.
Correspondingly, any account of the hospital association issue in Oregon that hopes even
to approach completeness will look beyond the private sector activities ofthe Oregon
State Medical Society to those of the other interest groups, including the hospital
associations and the Oregon State Federation of Labor. Such an account will also
examine both private sector and public sphere attempts by these groups to resolve the
issue in their favor - attempts which, by their very nature, would often bleed over from
one sphere to the other.
Bringing the public sphere into the narrative necessitates a discussion of the role
of the state in the hospital association cont1ict and, at an even more basic level, a
definition of what the state is. In her classic essay, "Bringing the State Back In," Theda
Skocpol presented two contrasting, yet complementary definitions of the state. Under the
first definition, the state acts as an autonomous actor. The state's capacity to act,
however, is not fixed. Instead, it is shaped and transformed by a number of factors: its
relations with various societal groups; crises which force it to mobilize its potential in
33 Ibid., pp. 92-93.
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ways that it would not do otherwise; the integrity of its jurisdictional control and the
loyalty of its officials; and its access to and ability to deploy financial resources. The
second definition describes the state as an institutional structure. Under this definition,
state structures and rules shape political outcomes. Skocpol wrote,
In this perspective, states matter not simply because of the goal-oriented activities of
state officials. They matter because their organizational configurations, along with
their overall patterns of activity, affect political culture, encourage some kinds of
group formation and collective political actions (but not others), and make possible
the raising of certain political issues (but not others).34
The state continues to contribute to policy formulation and implementation under the
second definition, but its role is passive rather than active. Skocpol claimed that these
views of the state can and do complement one another. The latter definition, however,
better suits the subject material addressed in the present paper.
The action over the hospital association issue played out between competing
interest groups in several arenas, including the private sector and the legislature. Within
the legislative arena, the state had little capacity to act. When it did act, it did so through
the boards and commissions. Second, the boards and commissions were dominated by
the relevant interest groups. When Skocpol discussed state capacity to act, she
emphasized the roles of "organizationally coherent collectivities of state officials,
especially collectivities of career officials relatively insulated from ties to currently
dominant socioeconomic interests ... ,,35 Oregon's workmen's compensation laws
34 Theda Skocpol, "Bringing the State Back In: Strategies of Analysis in Current
Research," in Bringing the State Back In, Peter Evans, Dietrich Rueschemeyer, and
Theda Skocpol, eds. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), p. 21.
35 Ibid., p. 9.
---------------------~
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required the governor to appoint three representatives to the State Industrial Accident
Commission: a labor representative, an industry representative, and a public
representative.36 Thus, SIAC was hardly composed of relatively insulated career officials.
The other boards and commissions relevant to the hospital association issue, including
the Oregon State Board of Health and the office of the Oregon State Insurance
Commissioner, also demonstrated close ties to various interest groups.
As labor historian Melvyn Dubofsky noted in the introduction to his state-
centered account of modern American labor history, "many social scientists, though
perhaps historians least of all, have been busily engaged in "bringing the state back in" to
scholarship.,,37 Thus, an examination of current research in political science and law on
the legislative process serves some use. William Eskridge et al broke theories of the
legislative process down into three categories: interest group theories, proceduralist
theories, and institutional theories. 38 The first two of these three are relevant to the
present study.
Interest group theories, which hold that legislative outcomes reflect the
preferences of interest groups, are best classed under what Dubofsky called the "pluralist
model of public policy implementation.,,39 Two main views exist as to what legislative
outcomes under interest group theory represent. When Dubofksy referred to the 'pluralist
36 Citation
37 Dubofsky, p. xi.
38 Eskridge, William, Philip Frickey, and Elizabeth Garrett. Legislation and Statutory
Interpretation (New York: Foundation Press, 2006, 2nd Edition), pp. 69-116.
39 Ib'd .I ., p. XIV.
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model,' he suggested that state officials mediate among contending interest groups.
Some scholars, however, argue that the interest groups essentially negotiate among
themselves, and the legislative vote on the point at issue is merely a rubber stamp on the
decision reached by those groups. The present study makes only a limited reliance on
interest group theory, in that it emphasizes the roles that the Oregon State Federation of
Labor, the Oregon State Medical Society, the hospital associations, and occasionally, the
casualty insurance lobby, played in the legislative process. There are two reasons behind
this choice. First, the aforementioned groups were not merely interest groups: they
actively controlled legislative seats and key committee posts. Second, the majority ofthe
legislative outcomes that affected the hospital association issue were losses determined
by committee votes. This fact suggests that factors beyond interest group dynamics
influenced the hospital association debates.
Proceduralist theories lie more in line with what Theda Skocpol described when
she presented the model of the state as an institutional structure. Under these theories,
the legislature's procedural rules shape legislative outcomes. At the center of all
proceduralist theories lies the concept of vetogates. These vetogates are essentially choke
points, derived from constitutional, legislative, and historical rules, which have the ability
to kill proposals. The most common vetogates are committee decisions, floor votes, and
conference meetings. Proceduralist models are especially relevant to the present study, as
both the hospital associations and the Oregon State Medical Society carefully exploited
key committee posts to block what they deemed to be undesirable legislation.
21
Overview ofthe Argument
When the hospital association issue is set in its proper historical and theoretical
context, a picture slightly different from the original Goldberg and Greenberg and Starr
accounts emerges. The present study thus makes three main arguments. First, attempts
to eliminate contract medicine extended back significantly further than these accounts
suggest. The Oregon State Federation of Labor was largely responsible for these
attempts, which they made through the legislative process. OrSFL failed to eliminate the
hospital associations by these means due to procedural constraints and the federation's
inability to form a lasting coalition with the Oregon State Medical Society. Second,
when OSMS became more focused on the hospital association issue during the 1930s, it
succeeded in imposing its own private code of ethics on the medical services market due
in part to its ability to exploit legislative procedure. Finally, in 1952, the United States
Supreme Court validated OSMS's imposition of its private code of ethics (in stark
contrast to publicly-developed regulations) when it determined that the medical society's
unique professional status exempted it from the rules that governed other sectors of the
private market.
Limitations
This study certainly attempts to present a more nuanced interpretation of the
hospital association issue in Oregon. At least two sets of limitations must be
acknowledged, however. The first major set of limitations is inherent to the writing of
legislative history. First, state legislature history presents special challenges. Not until
-----------------_.. _---------------------------
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1961 did the Oregon state legislature begin keeping regular, continuous committee
meeting notes.40 Press reports occasionally reproduced debates. Full reports were rare,
and newspaper stories were usually limited to a few sentences. Some alternative sources
exist: the Oregon State Federation of Labor discussed certain bills at its annual
convention; the medical profession debated measures in Northwest Medicine, the main
journal for the medical societies of Oregon, Washington, and Idah041 ; and Oregon Voter
contained long stories on selected pieces of legislation and the associated committee
activities. These sources, however, have their biases. The Oregon Voter magazine, for
example, received a constant flow of funding from National Hospital Association
advertisements.42 The present study attempts to corroborate accounts wherever possible,
and to draw carefully qualified conclusions elsewhere.
Even legislature-recorded committee meeting minutes present certain
methodological difficulties, however. In his widely-cited opinion in the case of In the
matter ofRussell E. Sinclair, Sr. and M Marguerite Sinclair, Judge Frank Easterbrook
launched five arguments against the use of legislative history in interpreting statutory text.
First, reports are often written by unelected staffers. The reports do not necessarily
reflect legislative consensus, especially because those vested with the power to vote on
40 "Oregon Legislative Records Guide," Oregon State Archives, Online, accessed
04/25/2010,
http://arcweb.sos.state.or.us/legislative/legislative_guide/legislative_guide/legal.html#Co
mmittee%20Minutes%20and%20Audio%20Tapes.
41 Larsell, The Doctor in Oregon: A Medical History (Portland: Binfords & Mort, 1947).
42 See, for example: National Hospital Association, [Advertisement], Oregon Voter, Vol.
39, No.2, Oct. 11, 1924, p. 60.
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legislation may never read these reports. Second, legislative history can be "loser's
history." A defeated group might attempt to write reports that will cause judges to
interpret the new statutes in their favor. Third, the use of legislative history imposes
ambiguous legal obligations and standards. Because it can be interpreted in so many
different ways, statutes' meanings might shift constantly, and the laws will lose their
power to guide action in the private sector. Fourth, legislative history gives creative
judges more tools to play with: they can easily warp its meaning to support practically
any position. Finally, legislative history lacks democratic legitimacy. Committee reports
are not subject to the bicameralism and presentment requirements contained in Article I,
Section 7 of the United States Constitution. Easterbrook's arguments boil down to the
simple proposition that sources of legislative history can have multiple meanings, closely
tied to their writers' and readers' preferences. This is true of all of historical texts, but
the stakes are especially high for these materials. The present study acknowledges the
weaknesses of these sources, and does its best to keep their biases in mind. The use of
these sources herein has no normative implications for statutory interpretation.43
A second limitation to the study must be acknowledged. This study aims to
examine the development of public and private attempts to "regulate" contract medicine
and hospital associations. In doing so, it focuses mainly on the activities of interest
groups both in the legislature and in the private sector. The problem of agency capture
plays an important role in the analysis. Little attention, however, was paid to the internal
43 870 F2d 1340 In the Matter ofRussell E Sinclair Sr and M Marguerite Sinclair.
Online. Accessed 04/25/1 O. http://openjurist.org/870/f2d/1340/in-the-matter-of-russell-
e-sinclair-sr-and-m-marguerite-sinclairs.
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dynamics of the regulatory agencies. In his study of the Texas Railroad Commission,
William Childs argued that historians should consider eight factors when analyzing
regulation in America in the first half of the twentieth century. Economic, legal, and
interest group forces number among these factors. Childs, however, also points out that
"[i]deology and cultural factors matter in regulation - sometimes as much as or more than
economic and legal forces." Childs divided culture into three categories: agency culture,
regulatory culture, and regional culture.44 The omission of a focused analysis of these
cultures is not so much one of willful neglect, but rather a general unavailability of
sources.
Chapter Overview
Each of the second, third, and fourth chapters of this study deals with both a
consecutive section of the chronological progression of events in the contract medicine
issue, and also a piece of the study's argument. Chapter two examines OrSFL's attempts
to eliminate contract medicine, and argues that procedural and interest group factors
prevented a public resolution of the issue. Chapter three turns to OSMS's attempts to
resolve the issue by imposing its private code of ethics on the medical services market,
and attempts to show that the same procedural factors which prevented a public
resolution of the issue gave the medical society the autonomy it needed to pursue its
private one. Finally, chapter four addresses the United States Supreme Court's
44 William R. Childs, The Texas Railroad Commission: Understanding Regulation in
America to the Mid-Twentieth Century (College Station: Texas A&M University Press,
2005), pp. 7, 262-264.
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adjudication of the issue in United States v. Oregon State Medical Society, and shows
how the medical society was able to protect its autonomy through not only legislative, but
also judicial processes.
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CHAPTER II
LEGISLATIVE DYNAMICS, THE OREGON STATE FEDERAnON OF LABOR,
AND THE HOSPITAL ASSOCIATION PROBLEM, 1917-1929
Secretary Stack thought it practically impossible to secure relief through action of the
Legislature. He was of the belief that only through the initiative and referendum could
workers hope to secure necessary relief.
Minutes of the Seventeenth Annual Convention of the Oregon State Federation of
Labor, October 1919
Between 1917 and 1929, the hospital association issue was mainly contested
within the public realm through the Oregon state legislature. The 1917 legislative session
marked the starting point for this period because in that year, the hospital associations
succeeded in entrenching themse1ves by persuading the legislature to delegate regulatory
power to the Oregon State Insurance Department. This body treated the hospital
associations highly favorably: the state insurance commissioner and the associations
appear to have had a close and comfortable relationship. Over the twelve years that
followed, the anti-hospital association forces attempted to wrest regulatory power from
the insurance department and to give it instead to the physician-dominated State Board of
Health, to forcibly alter fee collection practices, and to completely abolish the hospital
associations' role in the market for medical and surgical services for occupational injuries.
These forces failed for several reasons: the legislature's structure and rules enabled the
hospital associations to block these actions; the anti-hospital association coalition itself
suffered from internal divisions; and groups within the coalition were unable to come to
internal agreement. By the end of the decade, the impossibility of uprooting the hospital
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associations through the legislative process became very clear, and the Oregon State
Federation of Labor began to experiment with alternatives.
The Insurance Code of1917 and the Entrenchment ofthe Hospital Associations
Two major issues regarding hospital associations dominated the 1917 legislative
session. The first issue was state supervision of the deduction of fees. The second,
somewhat related issue was the certification of hospital association business transactions.
Although both issues would eventually come to the forefront of the hospital association
debate, the 1917 session seems unusual in that neither aroused very much controversy.
When the Oregon State Federation of Labor (OrSFL) opened its annual
convention at Labor Union Hall in Salem on January 22,1917, the issue of hospital fees
briefly occupied the convention's attention. In his speech to the convention, State
Industrial Accident Commissioner W.M. Marshall "enumerated abuses, including one of
questionable hospital fees, which he though [sic] should be corrected." When the
convention prepared its instructions to the Federation's legislative committee, the
questionable fee problem stood among its three goals for the twenty-ninth legislative
assembly. Representative Sweeney took the lead in introducing "a bill to correct the
hospital fee evil.,,45 On January 26, 1917, Sweeney's H.B. 346 received its first reading.
The bill gave employees full control over the approval of medical service plans, with
even already-existing plans subject to the bill's requirements. Under the proposed law,
45 Oregon State Federation of Labor. Year Bookfor Nineteen Seventeen, pp. 33-35.
(Oregon Historical Society Research Library).
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wage deductions could only be made if fifty-one percent of the employees voted in favor
ofthe plan. The employees were also given control over the selection of the company
physician and surgeon, with the only requirement between that the two would be in good
repute with the medical profession. Wage deductions were to be handled be an elected
executive committee of employees, who would report directly to the Oregon State
Commissioner of Labor.46
The Committee on Medicine, Pharmacy and Dentistry introduced a substitute for
H.B. 346 on February 17, 1917, when H.B. 549 was read for the first time. The bill
aimed at one oflabor's main concerns, namely the unlawful retention of hospital
association fees by employers for non-medical uses. The authority to enforce this
prohibition fell on the State Industrial Accident Commission (SIAC). The bill instructed
SIAC to cancel a contract service if it deemed the physician incompetent or the service
inefficient. The bill also aimed at reducing the fees employees paid, and gave SIAC
broad discretion in determining fee levels: employees dissatisfied with the amount or
manner of fee collection could complain to the commission. The commission's decision
on the manner could make the fee in question illegal based on a reasonableness
standard.47
46 Oregon. House. House Bill No. 346. Twenty-Ninth Legislative Assembly, Regular
Session, Jan. 26, 1917.
47 Reasonableness standards usually reserve wide discretion to the commissions or
courts in applying the applicable provisions. Because H.B. 549 did not provide any
specific standards or examples of unreasonable fees, SIAC would have been able to
determine the "reasonableness" of the fees on its own terms. [Oregon. House. House
Bill No. 549. Twenty-Ninth Legislative Assembly, Regular Session, February 15, 1917.]
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The substitute bill passed the House on February 16 on a vote of 31 to 17.48 The
reasons behind the 17 representatives' opposition to the bill are not entirely clear.
Representative K.K "Kap" Kubli was a well-known opponent of labor. According to the
Oregon Voter magazine, he was later elected to the 1919 legislature "in spite of every
effort made by Organized Labor to defeat him.,,49 The magazine, however, considered
Representative Ivan G. Martin to be a friend oflabor. He, too, opposed the bill. In the
Senate, the only opposition came from Senators Robert S. Farrell and W.H. Strayer when
the bill passed on February 19. Both senators were regarded as moderately pro-labor.
Overall, the opposition to the bill did not appear to generate a coherent line of attack, and
the apparent lack of press coverage suggests that it was not very controversial.
The state's revisions to the insurance code similarly aroused little controversy.
According to Oregon Voter, the insurance code was long in need of an overhaul by 1917.
The code had been haphazardly built over many legislative sessions, and the result was
conflicting provisions, duplications, and even entire sections invalidated by Oregon
Supreme Court decisions. Due to the code's history, the state Insurance Commission was
concerned that attempts to correct the problem would be stymied unless a coherent set of
codes were presented to the legislature. Thus, the state assembled a committee of eight to
48 State of Oregon. Journals a/the Senate and House a/the Twenty-Ninth Legislative
Assembly. Salem, Oregon: State Printing Department, 1917, p. 467.
49 c.c. Chapman, "Who's Who in the House," Oregon Voter, Vol. 16, No.1 Jan. 4,
1919, p. 53. The magazine did not publish its regular "who's who" in 1917, and thus
some biographies are missing.
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propose new legislation, appointing equal numbers of business and insurance
representatives, with the insurance commissioner as the committee's ex-officio chair. 5o
The National Hospital Association and other hospital associations appear to have
had some influence in the drafting of the new code. The state's casualty insurance
companies made a concerted effort to bring the hospital associations under the same
capital and surety bond requirements they themselves faced. In an October 13, 1916
letter to Insurance Commissioner Harvey Wells, Oregon Surety & Casualty Company
General Manager c.H. Weston argued that it was unfair to treat hospital associations any
differently than other insurance companies. He wrote, "We believe that the liability of
the Hospital Association exceeds the liability of the Health and Accident Insurance
Company which sells cash indemnity policies." The only fair way to proceed to was
require hospital associations to raise $100,000.00, or, at the very least, $50,000.00. This
might eliminate several hospital associations, he conceded, but the remaining associations
could "join hands" to raise the necessary capital. 51
Commissioner Wells was closely tied to the hospital associations, and apparently
did his best to protect their interests as ex-officio chair. In a December 22, 1916, letter to
H,J. Slusher, manager of the Lumbermen's Hospital Association, he wrote of the
"concerted effort on the part of a few to bring hospital associations under the
requirements of domestic insurance companies," reassuring Slusher that he would
50 Harvey Wells, Letter to W,J. Clemens, Feb. 20, 1915, Oregon State Archives, Ace.
60A 31/3-4, Box 91 of 116,5/8/6/6.
51 C.R Weston, Letter to Harvey Wells, Oct. 13, 1916, Oregon State Archives, Ace.
60A 31/3-4, Box 91 of 116,5/8/6/6.
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"cooperate in any way possible to protect the interests of any legitimate hospital
associations ... ,,52 In another letter a month prior, Wells reassured National Hospital
Association General Manager C.C. Bechtold that he would push Bechtold's
recommendations for the new code on the committee. He wrote, "This is to advise that I
will try and get the general committee to permit me to make this part of the code ...
However, if it does not become a part of the code I personally will recommend it to the
Legislature and request that it become a part of the insurance code.,,53
Exactly what the contents of Bechtold's recommendations were is unclear from
the documentary record. The National Hospital Association, however, later expressed
enthusiasm for both the insurance code and RB. 549. An NHA manuscript which cannot
be described less than odd for its frequent tone shifts claims that "[b]oth of these laws
were enacted largely through the efforts of the National Hospital Association.,,54 What is
clear is that the state's hospital associations, and especially the National Hospital
Association, accepted regulation by the Insurance Commission, and would later resist
attempts to shift power to supervise their affairs to other departments.
The Committee of Eight eventually presented their recommendations as Senate
Bill No. 278 on February 6,1917. Most importantly, the bill legitimated medical aid
52 Harvey Wells, Letter to RJ. Slusher, December 22, 1916, Oregon State Archives,
Ace. 60A 31/3-4, Box 91 of 116, 5/8/6/6.
53 Harvey Wells, Letter to C.C. Bechtold, November 6,1916, Oregon State Archives,
Ace. 60A 31/3-4, Box 91 of 116,5/8/6/6.
54 "History." Oregon Historical Society Research Library, Farwest American Assurance
Records, Mss 2863, Box 1 of 8, Folder 1.
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contracts between individual doctors or hospital associations and employers for both
occupational injuries and non-occupational sickness. The individual doctors and
associations were placed under the supervision of the insurance commissioner, who was
given the power to issue the certificates necessary for transacting business in the state.
The bill set very strict standards for the awarding of the certificates. The doctor or
association was required to put up capital stock of $5,000.00 (significantly less than the
amount demanded by the Oregon Surety & Casualty Company) and a surety bond of
$10,000.00. The bill also required the associations to license their sales agents under the
same procedures as required of insurance agents. So long as these requirements were met,
the bill made it "the duty of the Insurance Commissioner of this State to issue a certificate
authorizing such corporation, society, firm, partnership or individual to transact business
under the provisions hereof.,,55 Simply put, the insurance commissioner himself had very
little discretion in the certification of new hospital associations.
The bill sailed through both houses of the legislature with relatively little
opposition, and the governor signed it into law on February 16, 1917. Only eight
senators opposed it, and a lone representative voted against it. As was the situation for
H.B. 549, the opposition to the insurance code seems relatively incoherent. Among the
"nay" voters were two practicing lawyers, a businessman, a commercial fruit grower, and
a physician in active practice.56 Curiously, however, Senator Dr. J.C. Smith (R-Grants
55 Oregon. Senate. Senate Bill No. 278. Twenty-Ninth Legislative Assembly, Regular
Session, Feb. 6, 1917.
56 "Who's Who in the Legislature," Oregon Voter, Vol. 16, No.1 Jan. 4,1919, p. 11.
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Pass), another physician, voted for the bill. The medical society would later throw its
weight behind a bill which would shift certification from the insurance commission to
another department. Smith's support of the bill is significant because he was actively
involved in the Oregon State Medical Association's policy activities. For example, Dr.
Smith represented the society's Committee on Public Policy when he proposed changes
to the workmen's compensation system at a July 17, 1918 meeting of the OSMA House
of Delegates.57 The House of Delegates did not touch the insurance code issue at all in its
1918 meeting, which suggests that organized medicine, at least within the state of Oregon,
had not reached any degree of consensus on the hospital association issue even shortly
after the legislature passed the 1917 reforms.58
An article in the May, 1917 issue of the Portland Medical Sentinel suggests the
same lack of consensus. Doctor Clark E. Saunders, Superintendent of the Medical
Department of the C. & O. Lumber Company in Brookings, Oregon, described his
experience as a company doctor. Saunders initially approached contract medicine with
skepticism. He wrote that he remembered "being present at a certain state society
meeting" as a young physician, "when the subject of the "Vile" Contract Doctor was
57 "Minutes of the House of Delegates of the Oregon State Medical Association,"
Northwest Medicine, Sept, 1918, Vol. 17, No.9, p. 273.
58 Oregon State Federation of Labor records suggest that both Senator Wood (the
physician who opposed the bill) and Senator Smith were contract doctors. Thus, even
among contract doctors, the hospital association issue was probably far from settled in
1917. [Oregon State Federation of Labor. Year Book/or Nineteen Hundred Twenty, 1920,
p.20.]
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being expatiated on by one of the elite members of our very honorable calling ... ,,59
Saunders launched two main arguments in favor of contract medicine as he practiced it.
First, his status as company doctor allowed him to take care of the health of the entire
camp, not just the individual patients. He was given "complete charge ... over and for,
things sanitary and hygienic in all the Company operations.,,60 Second, his presence in
the camp encouraged patients to resolve medical problems early instead of
procrastinating. The overall effect of his presence was improved efficiency and
improved health. Saunders summarized his piece, writing, "I believe that the Industrial
Physician has come to stay.,,61 The medical societies had no choice but to accept and
improve contract medicine.
Saunders' piece is notable not merely because it demonstrates a lack of consensus
over the contract medicine issue, but also because it is written by a single contract doctor.
Saunders did not defend the corporate practices of the hospital associations, but merely
the activities of the single, probably medical society-affiliated contract physician. The
Oregon State Medical Society by no means endorsed contract medicine, but it seemed to
reserve its most intense attacks for the hospital associations.
OrSFL took a similar stance as it came to vigorously oppose hospital associations
by the conclusion of its 1919 convention. The federation's position at its 1918 annual
59 Clark E. Saunders, "A New Specialty," Medical Sentinel, Vol. 25, No.5, May, 1917,
p.3485.
60 Ibid., p. 3486.
61 Ibid., p. 3490.
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convention, however, was far muddier. The convention passed a resolution which
declared that the workers should be permitted to choose their own physicians, something
that the hospital association system would not permit. Furthermore, the convention
followed up on its 1917 legislative activities, declaring that SIAC should be given more
power to supervise payments for medical services and hospital accommodations. Beyond
supervision, the convention reached no consensus on whether or not employers should be
permitted to deduct hospital fees. The main problem with the hospital fee deduction,
Delegate Arthur Jones pointed out, was one of mobility. A worker would join a lumber
camp, pay his hospital fees for the entire month, and leave to work for another camp soon
after. His payment would not carryover, and as a result, the workers would be forced to
pay redundant fees. As a compromise, Jones suggested that workers pay their fees in
smaller, more spread-out installments of 4 cents per working day. Hospital fees served
an important purpose, Jones' "objection being only to the manner of collection usually
followed. ,,62
By 1919, the State Federation of Labor adopted a stronger anti-hospital
association stance. The federation's executive board continued to push for free choice of
physician and supervision of payments by SIAC. To these positions, the convention
added a resolution, adopted on January 9, 1919. The resolution stated that the federation
was "opposed to all hospital associations operated for profit," and said that it would
"unanimously go on record as being opposed to all hospital associations conducted on
62 Oregon State Federation of Labor. Year Book 1918: Proceedings ofthe Fifteenth
Annual Convention. Portland: Allied Printing, 1918, pp. 21-22.
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compulsory monthly dues, which are set by the employer.,,63 The 1919 resolution
represented a departure from the compromise Jones suggested at the 1918 convention.
The exact reasons for the shift in the federation's stance on the hospital association issue
are unclear, but the legislative battles which followed just weeks later offer some
tentative answers.
The hospital associations' opponents introduced a package oftwo bills to the
Oregon House on January 31, 1919. Representative Eugene E. Smith, described as
"Multnomah County's well known labor representative" by his opponents, sponsored
House Bills 286 and 287.64 These bills were intended to replace the compromise reached
in H.B. 549 during the 1917 legislative session. House Bill 286 sought to write OrSFL's
objection to compulsory monthly hospital association dues into law. By making it
unlawful to deduct from employee wages for medical purposes, "except as may be
required by the workmen's compensation laws," H.B. 286 eliminated all non-workmen's
compensation-based medical coverage by hospital associations. The bill also gave
employees far more leverage in pursuing their grievances: instead of appealing to SIAC,
the employee was given cause of action to pursue his claims through the judiciary. The
bill instructed the latter to give hospital fee deduction claims precedence over all cases
63 Oregon State Federation of Labor. Year Book 1919: Proceedings ofthe Sixteenth
Annual Convention. Portland: Allied Printing, 1919, pp. 31-32.
64 Prudential Hospital Association, "House Bills 286 and 287," Oregon Voter, Vol. ,
No., p. 25.
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except criminal cases. Furthermore, the bill established a remedy of punitive damages
"three times the amount for which the verdict was rendered, but not ... less than $25.,,65
The measure's companion bill, RB. 287, shifted the regulation and licensing of
the hospital associations from the State Insurance Commission to the State Board of
Health. The bill had two particularly notable features. First, it gave the Board of Health
much wider discretion in revoking certificates than the 1917 insurance code granted the
Insurance Commission. If an employee filed a complaint against a hospital association,
the board had merely to hold a hearing before it could revoke the association's certificate.
The bill set out no specific standards for the board to adhere to. Second, the bill applied
only to hospital associations. The 1917 act gave the insurance commissioner jurisdiction
over "any individual, firm, association, or company, which may contract with any
employer for the medical, surgical or hospital care and attention of his employes.,,66
House Bill No. 287, however, specifically exempted fraternal orders, and applied only to
"[a] 11 hospitals and hospital associations that collect regular installments of money...
periodically from individuals, families, organizations, corporations or partnerships... ,,67
The bill essentially sought to deregulate individual contract doctors, and preserved a
protection of the labor movement's fraternal benefit societies written into the 1917 code.
65 Oregon. House. House Bill No. 286. Thirtieth Legislative Assembly, Regular
Session, Jan. 31,1919.
66 Oregon. House. House Bill No. 549. Twenty-Ninth Legislative Assembly, 1917, p. 1.
67 Oregon. House. House Bill No. 287. Thirtieth Legislative Assembly, 1919, p. 1.
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Because the documentary record is rather thin, the exact motives behind two bills
are rather difficult to deduce. In an article in the Oregon Voter magazine, R.M. Standish
suggested that the casualty insurance companies actively riled up organized labor.68 He
wrote, "[C]loser investigation discloses other interests behind this antagonism [toward
hospital associations], including some of the casualty insurance companies, whose field
of endeavor has to some extent been invaded by the hospital associations.,,69 The
casualty insurance companies' letters to Insurance Commissioner Harvey Wells
preceding the enactment of the 1917 insurance code pertaining to hospital associations
may support Standish's contention that the companies were behind the legislation.
Standish specifically mentioned the companies were upset that the hospital associations
had to meet significantly lower capital and surety bond requirements. If the casualty
insurance companies were behind the legislation, however, they must have acted mostly
behind the scenes.
The medical societies may also have played a role in the bills. The hospital
associations' statements in Oregon Voter magazine suggest, not without evidence, that
the bills were an effort by organized medicine to clamp down on association activity.
The National Hospital Association complained that H.B. 287 would switch regulatory
oversight of the hospital associations from the Insurance Commission to the State Board
of Health. If the change were made, the NHA asserted, "it is naturally feared that
68 Exactly why the casualty insurance companies and the Oregon State Federation of
Labor may have formed an alliance in 1919 is unclear. That the alliance was temporarily
mutually-beneficial is not outside the realm of possibility, however.
69 R.M. Standish, "Hospital Insurance," Oregon Voter, Vol. No. Jan. 18, 1919, p. 15.
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hospital associations would suffer from unjust regulation by a board, which in the nature
of its work, is ordinarily controlled by and made up of representatives of the self-styled
ETHICAL PHYSICIANS, who are known to be hostile to hospital associations.,,70 The
Prudential Hospital Association made similar claims, and latched onto the proposed
exemption of individual contracts from the board's regulatory oversight. "The contract
doctor. .. ," Prudential argued, "is more or less recognized by the ethical medical fraternity,
yet his corporate competitors are viewed as a menace.,,71 While the texts of the bills do
cast suspicion on the medical fraternity, however, the actual progress of the bills through
the legislature suggests that the issue was not so simple.
House Bills 286 and 287 fared poorly in the House. After the bills' first readings
on January 31, they were referred to the House Committee on Labor and Industries on
February 3. The committee deliberated on the bills, and ten days later recommended two
amendments to H.B. 286. First, they recommended excepting companies operating
through interstate commerce from the bills requirements. Second, they proposed
allowing medical service contracts for non-workmen's compensation care, something the
original bill strictly prohibited. By the next day, the impossibility of passing the two bills
became clear, and the committee substituted a new bill, H.B. 445, once again sponsored
by Representative Smith. This bill preserved SIAC's supervisory power over fee
collection, and enhanced the commission's rule-making authority. Furthermore, it gave
70 National Hospital Association, "House Bills 286 and 287," Oregon Voter, Vol. No.
Jan 18, 1919, pp. 25-26.
71 Prudential Hospital Association, "Hospital Associations and Contract Doctors,"
Oregon Voter, Vol. No. Jan 18, 1919, p. 27.
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workers more say in the signing of hospital contracts by requiring approval by a vote of
at least 51 percent of a plant's employees. As an apparent concession to hospital
associations and employers, however, the bill grandfathered in already-existing
contracts. 72 On the evening of February 19, the compromise bill passed the House by a
vote of 44-to-2. 73 Upon transmittal to the Senate, however, the bill died. Soon after,
Oregon Voter lamented the bill's death, writing, "[e]nactment of this bill would have
provided a compromise adjustment which seemed to be satisfactory to all parties
interested." As the situation was, the magazine predicted that the legislature would once
again have to face the hospital association issue when it convened in 1921.
Why did all three bills die? OrSFL Legislative Committeeman Walter G. Lynn
offered his analysis at the federation's annual convention the next year. According to
Lynn, House Bills 286 and 287 had to be withdrawn for three reasons. First, the "array of
contract doctors and attorneys for hospital associations" who held seats in the thirtieth
legislative assembly strongly opposed the reforms. Second, the other legislators did not
want to leave workers without any kind of hospital protection. Union support of the bill
was not enough to override these legislators' concerns. Finally, the idea of the 51 percent
approval compromise made the original bills less attractive. Once this compromise
gained the House's near-unanimous support in the form ofH.B. 445, however, it was
killed in the Senate. Lynn explained,
72 Oregon. House. House Bill No. 445. Thirtieth Legislative Assembly, Regular Session,
Feb. 14, 1919.
73 State of Oregon. Journals ofthe Senate and House ofthe Thirtieth Legislative
Assembly. Salem, Oregon: State Printing Department, 1919, pp. 377, 382, 450, 458, 501.
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The bill ... went to the Senate, and to a committee on which were two contract
doctors, Wood and Smith. Just at a time when I had every reason to believe it
would be passed, opposition from Attorney U'Reu and Brother Frank Hannan,
appeared: the committee reported unfavorably, and the bill was indefinitely
postponed. 74
Senators Wood and Smith had previously split on the insurance code, and both their
activities, and those of the contract doctors in the House, suggest that the Oregon State
Medical Association either had an incoherent stance on hospital associations, a weak
legislative strategy, or both. Some of the contract doctors, of course, may have been
employed by hospital associations, and their opposition to the bills, as well as that of the
hospital association attorneys, makes perfect sense. Other contract doctors, however,
including Senator Smith, were active and influential members of the medical societies.
The medical societies stood to gain from switching oversight of the hospital associations
from the Insurance Commission to the Board of Health.
The absence of firm, absolutely coherent evidence of the motives and behind-the-
scenes activities regarding the 1919 hospital association bills limits the conclusions that
can be drawn. The session's events do suggest a few things, though. First, labor,
insurance, and perhaps medical society groups probably formed coalitions to try to limit
or even destroy the hospital associations. Second, OSMA had yet to develop a well-
articulated stance on the hospital association issue, and the votes of legislator-physicians
may have reflected this. Third, even without commanding a clear majority, pro- and anti-
74 Oregon State Federation of Labor. Year Book/or Nineteen Hundred Twenty, 1920, p.
20.
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hospital association groups could affect public policy outcomes by securing seats on
influential legislative committees and possibly even state boards and commissions.75
Changes Leading up to the 1921 Legislative Session
In the two year span between the close of the 1919 legislative session and the
inevitable showdown that the Oregon Voter magazine had predicted after the Senate
killed H.B. 445, three major developments occurred. First, the medical societies began to
develop a clearer stance on the hospital association issue. Second, the State Industrial
Accident Commission attempted to take independent action against the hospital
associations. Finally, the governor appointed a "Committee of Fifteen" representatives of
labor, industry, and the general public to recommend changes to the workmen's
compensation system, including the 1917 insurance code provisions relating to hospital
associations.
In February 1920, the Portland City and County Medical Society adopted a strong
anti-hospital association resolution.76 The resolution read, "No physician or surgeon who
employs an agent to solicit medical or surgical practice, or is employed by an
organization that employs an agent to solicit medical or surgical practice, or owns stock
75 For information on the battle over compulsory health insurance in the 1910s, see:
Ronald L. Numbers, Almost Persuaded: American Physicians and Compulsory Health
Insurance, 1912-1920 (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1978).
76 The Portland City and County Medical Society later became the Multnomah County
Medical Society, discussed in Chapter 3. See: Larsell, The Doctor in Oregon: A Medical
History (Portland: Binfords & Mort, 1947), p. 200.
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in such an organization, is eligible to membership in this Society."n Within the medical
community, there was no doubt about the intent behind the resolution: Northwest
Medicine reported, "This action was directed against hospital associations which employ
agents for this form of solicitation.,,78 Even if the medical society had perfect aim,
however, Oregon Voter predicted that the resolution would probably eventually bar non-
association contract doctors.
The medical society was probably not overly concerned about protecting non-
hospital association contract doctors. An Aprill920 editorial in Northwest Medicine
placed contract practices into three categories, none of which recommended it highly:
"excusable," "questionable," and "wholly iniquitous." The editorialist argued that
contract doctors undercut other physicians by offering their services at a reduced fee.
Furthermore, he charged, contract medicine promoted intellectual laziness: the contract
physician might simply secure a large number of contracts, and then rest on his laurels
instead of continuing to improve the quality of his service. One solution to the contract
medicine problem, the editorialist half-heartedly suggested, was the establishment of
mutual benefit associations among employees. Administered by a "well-chosen group of
men," the beneficial association could purchase medical services at market value when
most desirable. Such a system would clearly benefit the medical profession, which
would gain freedom from the price competition posed by the contract physicians.79 Of
n "Tradition vs. Progress," Oregon Voter, Vol. No. ,Feb. 14, 1920, p. 299.
78 "Use of Agents Forbidden," Northwest Medicine, Vol. 19, No.3, March 1920, p. 79.
79 "Contract Medicine," Northwest Medicine, Vol. 19, No.4, April 1920, p. 106.
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course, the editorialist did not speak for the medical society, but his words did reflect the
more moderate strain of opinion on the contract medicine issue. Contract medicine was
inherently suspect, and the society had to approach it carefully.
Even the editorialist's mutual benefit association solution posed a problem for
organized medicine. In his own words, the solution approached "dangerously near the
question of health insurance ... "so Just fresh from its near-miss encounter with state
medical insurance, the organized medicine was extremely wary of any solution which
might lead to the adoption of such a system. An editorial in the May, 1920 issue of
Northwest Medicine summed the problem up perfectly:
Commercialism on the one hand and socialism on the other threaten this
independence ... With... cooperation of all factors involved, we need never bow our
heads to the political boss, or walking delegate of either capital or labor. SI
In fact, relations between organized labor and the medical profession appear to have been
strained around this time. In September 1919, the Oregon State Federation of Labor
rejected a charter application by 12 Portland physicians who sought to form a union
affiliate with the OrSFL. As fee earners, the OrSFL president argued, the physicians
were not laborers. S2 On top of this minor issue lay the even more critical question of state
medical insurance. By 1920, the physicians opposed the idea, but the OrSFL seemed
more receptive. In his report on the failed 1919 legislative battle, Walter G. Lynn
so Ibid.
SI "Standardization of Hospitals Versus State Medicine," Northwest Medicine, Vol. 19,
No.5, May, 1920, p. 131.
S2 "Physicians and the State Federation of Labor," Northwest Medicine, Vol. 19, No.3,
March, 1920, p. 79.
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remarked, "And equally difficult will it be to secure state health insurance" as an
alternative to the hospital associations. "Opposition to state health insurance is very
strong," he concluded. 83 The OrSFL's support for state health insurance showed no sign
of abating in the months leading up to the 1921 legislative session, and ultimately this
split between organized labor and organized medicine may have weakened both groups'
chances to successfully combat the hospital associations come 1921.
In the meantime, the State Industrial Accident Commission undertook its own
action against the hospital associations. Around early January 1920, SIAC attempted to
persuade employers around the state to voluntarily give up hospital association contracts
and come under the state system. In its letter to the employers, the commission wrote, "If
it is desirable to have a hospital contract at all, we suggest that the hospital contract apply
only to the care of your employees and their families in time of sickness or in cases of
injury which does not occur in the course of employment.,,84 The commission's
suggestion would consolidate all care for occupational injuries under state insurance,
threatening to significantly reduce the hospital associations' market shares to only non-
occupational medical care.
The National Hospital Association, a private, local hospital association, did not
react kindly to SIAC's suggestion. As the state's largest hospital association,85 NHA
83 Oregon State Federation of Labor. Year Bookfor Nineteen Hundred Twenty, 1920, p.
20.
84 "Suggestion Unpopular," Oregon Voter, Vol. No., Feb 21,1920, p. 336.
85 In 1920, the National Hospital Association reported $254,356.59 in revenue. The
Astoria-based Lumbermen's Hospital Association reported the next-highest figure, at
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directly attacked the commission's plan to bring all occupational injuries under state
insurance. In a letter to its clients, SIAC wrote,
Their suggestion in paragraph 2, regarding the contract applying only to sickness
and injuries received out of working hours is not practical. It is not only
important that employes [sic] be provided with proper Medical and Surgical
Services, but that a means of properly obtaining this service be established.
Sickness and injuries are so closely related that the means of providing relief
should not be separated. Remove from you the right to contract for the care of
your men on account of injuries and your interest in the care of your men in case
of sickness is lessened. Would this not result in a great many instances of a return
to the old "pass the hat" system so badly abused a number of years ago?86
Separating occupational and non-occupational injuries would be impossible, NHA
contended. Even if the association was not completely correct about this, the move
would certainly have cut into their market share. The NHA may have been correct in its
suggestion that the SIAC move would eliminate the hospital associations completely.
Despite the commission's stated goals of ending the mistreatment of workers under the
contracts and providing free choice of physician, the Oregon Voter magazine reported
that the "evident intent of this suggestion is to overthrow the present system of dealing
with private concerns and to establish in its place a State Health Insurance System... ,,87
This line of analysis had some support, even if it was tainted by Oregon Voter's obvious
$40,630.14. Oregon. Insurance Department. Annual Report ofthe Insurance
Commissioner for the Year Ending December 31, 1921 (Salem: State Printing
Department, 1922).
86 C.C. Bechtold, Letter, Jan. 13,1920, Oregon Historical Society, Mss 2863, Vol. 11,
1909-1920, page 42.
87 "Suggestion Unpopular," Oregon Voter.
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pro-hospital association bias. 88 HeillY T. Mears, a Portland-based employer, thought that
SIAC's proposal was "a labor union move, as the Commission is now mostly under the
domination ofthe union element.,,89 Given OrSFL's support for state health insurance,
Mears' contention may have had some merit.
Another argument complicated the situation, however. According to Oregon
Voter, "the proposed suggestion of the Commission may have been prompted in part by
the so-called ethical medical fraternity.,,90 Organized medicine would certainly have
been willing to overthrow the hospital associations. It would not, however, have been
likely to support a complete system of state health insurance for both occupational
injuries and non-occupational illnesses. Thus, to the extent that it may have participated
in urging SIAC's action, its goals were probably somewhat different from OrSFL's.
Aside from bad feelings, nothing came of SIAC's letter. If it was behind the letter,
OrSFL was un-thwarted: the federation would have another chance to try to disable the
hospital associations a few months down the line when the governor convened a
Committee of Fifteen on Revision of the Compensation Law. Along the lines of the
original workmen's compensation compromise, the committee consisted of five
representatives of employers; five representatives of labor, all of whom were OrSFL-
affiliated; and five representatives ofthe general public, including Dr. Thorald
88 Not only was the National Hospital Association a regular advertiser in the magazine,
but Oregon Voter also made its stance on the hospital association issue very clear in its
articles.
89 "Suggestion Unpopular," Oregon Voter, p. 341
90 Ibid., p. 343.
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Thoraldsen, who would later become both president of the Multnomah County Medical
Society and an affiliate of the National Hospital Association. 91 The committee's main
purpose was to recommend a package of revisions to the workmen's compensation
system for the 1921 legislative session to consider. Included on the agenda was the
contentious hospital association issue.92
The State Industrial Accident Commission set the agenda when the Committee of
Fifteen first met on July 19, 1920. Regarding the hospital association issue, SIAC
instructed the committee to consider what it thought to be labor's three main complaints
about the existing system. First, labor complained about the lack of choice employees
faced in selecting their physicians. Second, the payment of monthly fees in a single
installment angered those transient workers who moved from camp to camp. Finally,
labor lacked a voice in the selection and establishment of medical aid plans. Industrial
Accident Commission Chairman William Marshall advised the committee, "If any
changes are to be had through legislative action, we believe they will come only through
recommendation of your body, if we can judge by the experience of past legislative
sessions.',93 A bill endorsed by the public, labor, and industry might not suffer the same
fate that House Bills 286 and 287 faced in 1919.
91 For information on the original workmen's compensation compromise, see: Lawrence
Friedman and Jack Ladinsky, "Social Change and the Law oflndustrial Accidents,"
Columbia Law Review, 1967, vol. 67, pp. 50-82.
92 "Restoration of State Aid Proposed," Oregon Voter, Vol. 22, No. , July 24, 1920, p.
160.
93 Ibid., p. 169.
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When the committee reconvened in August, it determined that the hospital
association issue was controversial enough to warrant the appointment of a three-member
subcommittee. Thoraldsen was chosen as the public representative, with B.W. Sleeman
and B.C. Ball as the labor and industry representatives, respectively.94 The subcommittee
reported back to the larger Committee of Fifteen on September 13, 1920, and its
recommendations did not favor the labor stance. The subcommittee's report, as
reproduced in Oregon Voter, stated, "There seems to be no doubt that the majority of
hospital associations have done good and effective work and no condition should be
imposed on them which will prevent he continuation of their good work.,,95 Labor's
complaints did not completely lack merit, however, and the subcommittee attempted to
make two key concessions: Dr. Thoraldsen argued that the employees should be given
some voice in the selection of hospital associations, and that individuals should be given
the right to choose another physician under SIAC supervision.
Mr. C.C. Bechtold, General Manager for NHA, attacked Thoraldsen's
concessions. Most of the anti-hospital association agitation, he claimed, came not from
steady workers, but instead "floaters" affiliated with the radical Industrial Workers ofthe
World union. Employers, Bechtold argued, were far more qualified to make decisions
about medical service contracts than their employees. In place of Thoraldsen's plan,
Bechtold offered one of his own: (1) SIAC would have full supervision over both
94 "Progress in Compensation Law Changes," Oregon Voter, Vol. 22, No. , August 14,
1920, pp. 331-332.
95 "State Insurance is Labor Objective," Oregon Voter, Vol. 22, No. , Sept. 18, 1920, p.
564.
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contract and non-contract plans; (2) both contract and non-contract plans would be
recognized; (3) SIAC would be in charge of regulating contracts and formulating rules;
and (4) employees leaving their employers before the end of the month would receive
certificates to transfer the remaining value oftheir monthly contribution to their next
employer.
The committee's labor delegates did not respond well to Bechtold's proposal, and
charged that it did nothing to eliminate the hospital associations' profit motives. Frank
Hannan, one of the five labor representatives on the committee declared, "State insurance
is what we favor ... then our troubles are over," clearly aligning himself with the stance
SIAC took in its January, 1920 letter. The committee, however, did not take Hannan's
suggestion, and instead adopted Dr. Thoraldsen's compromise proposals.96
In response to the August meeting, OrSFL's executive board issued its own
recommendations. The board backed up Hannan's stronger approach. In its specific
comments on the law, it proposed that SIAC be put fully in control of medical, surgical,
and hospital care for injuries, and that medical care for occupational injuries "not be
subject to contract." In this proposal, the board also indicated that it would allow hospital
association contracts for non-occupational medical service, but that such a contract would
only be permitted when the workers approved it on a majority vote.97 In another
statement, issued at approximately the same time, the board stated, unequivocally, that
96 Ibid., p. 44.
97 "Compensation Law Amendments Sought by Organized Labor," Oregon Voter, Vol.
22, No. Nov. 13, 1920, p. 461.
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"all contract hospitals and contract doctors be eliminated and prohibited.,,98 Ultimately,
the Committee of Fifteen accepted neither version of the board's proposal, instead
incorporating Thoraldsen's proposal into its final recommendation. Perhaps as a minor
concession to labor, however, the committee's proposal did call for collection of dues on
a daily, rather than monthly basis.99
The committee's proposal was not met with much acceptance by NHA. In a
January 1, 1921 editorial, Bechtold castigated the proposal's per diem and voting
requirements. Daily deductions, he argued, would be costly due to the extra clerical work
involved. In fact, according to Bechtold, the workers preferred the monthly payment
system! The employees were also incapable of selecting their own doctors or
associations. Borrowing an often-trumpeted phrase from the medical societies, Bechtold
predicted that "it would result in constant solicitation of the employees."IOO Of course,
solicitation's real threat was not to the medical profession, but rather to the workers'
productive capacities. Despite his opposition to some of the specific provisions, however,
Bechtold did accept regulation of the hospital associations.
The proposal also failed to gain the support of the Oregon logging industry, which
appears to have been one of the leading voices in the state legislature on the hospital
association issue. The Oregon Voter magazine reported that "some of the loggers were
98 "Kay Insists Upon Compensation Economy," Oregon Voter, Vol. 22, No. ,p. 445.
99 "Favors Rewards and Penalties for Safety," Oregon Voter, Vol. 22, No. , Dec. 11,
1920, pp. 699-700
100 C.C. Bechtold, "Society's Duty Toward the Injured or Sick Workers," Oregon Voter,
Vol. 22, No. ,Jan 1, 1921, p. 22.
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obdurate, feeling that for their isolated camps practical abolition of hospital associations
and contract doctors would result in lack of care for injured workmen... ,,101 The
magazine predicted that this minority would mount a fierce fight in the legislature, and
probably with some chance of success: Representative Thomas B. Kay, both a member of
the Committee of Fifteen, and also the powerful House Committee on Labor and
Industries, might have a chance to amend the bill in committee, or simply to kill it
outright.
The Committee on Labor and Industries ultimately took the responsibility of
introducing the hospital association proposals as House Bill 189. The text of the bill that
the committee introduced, and the action that it took, suggests that the proposal's
opponents used the committee system to kill the legislation. First, the committee made
substantial modifications to the original proposals. Second, the bill's opponents used the
committee's status as a vetogate to table the bill.
When H.B. 189 received its first reading on January 28, 1921, listeners might
have noted how remarkably different it was from the proposals put forth by the
Committee of Fifteen. Most notably, it omitted the majority vote requirement for
approving new hospital contracts. In place of the employees' secret ballot, the H.B. 189
declared that the contracts would be legal provided that they were formulated "in such a
manner as the state industrial accident commission may find and determine to
101 "Compensation Law Committee Makes Final Report," Oregon Voter, Vol. 22, No. ,
Jan. 15,1921, p. 213.
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reasonable ... ,,102 The bill also deleted the per diem payment basis from the original
proposal: hospital contract fees would continue to be collected at the beginning of the
month in a single payment. Even these changes would not have placated the bills'
opponents. House Bill 189 contained a provision from the original proposal which made
the hospital associations financially liable for recurring conditions. To enforce this
provision, the bill allowed SIAC to cancel non-compliant hospital associations' contracts.
Following its reading, the House referred the bill to the Committee on Labor and
Industry. The committee wasted little time, and produced a majority report
recommending that the bill not pass on February 9. Representatives Lynn and J.N.
Johnston produced a minority report which would have made the bill stronger from
OrSFL's perspective. This report was hardly enough to overcome the opposition of
Representatives Kubli, Kay, and W.T. Gordon, and on Kubli's motion, the majority
report was adopted and the bill was indefinitely postponed.
The 1921 legislative session's outcome had two important consequences. First, it
very clearly demonstrated that even with the support of a governor-appointed committee,
anti-hospital association legislation had little chance of passing. The bill's opponents
skillfully used their majorities on key committees to kill proposals to limit the
associations' activities. The failure of H.B. 189 through death-by-committee probably
lent credence to a belief expressed two years earlier at OrSFL' s 1919 convention. When
the convention first discussed Industrial Accident Commissioner Marshall's proposal for
102 Oregon. House. House Bill No. 189. Thirty-First Legislative Assembly Regular
Session, Jan. 28, 1921, p. 1
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the governor to appoint the committee of fifteen, Federation Secretary EJ. Stack
skeptically remarked that only through initiative and referendum would labor find any
relief from the conditions they faced under the workmen's compensation system. 103 In
fact, OrSFL would rely on the initiative approach when it made its next move.
Second, the legislative session revealed the Oregon State Medical Society's
declining influence over the hospital association issue. In the past, OSMS had worked
closely with OrSFL to gain traction on the hospital association issue. The medical
society, however, was noticeably absent from Oregon Voter's coverage of the Committee
of Fifteen's activities. This absence was not an accident on the reporter's fault. Only one
report on the committee's activities appeared in Northwest Medicine, and its tone
suggests that the medical society watched the formulation of the legislation from afar. 104
Although Dr. Thoraldsen was both a member of the medical society and the Committee
of Fifteen, his views may not have been exactly in line with the medical society's
evolving policy on contract practice. Some fifteen years later, he would resign from the
Multnomah County Medical Society over his affiliation with the National Hospital
Association, and his proposals to the committee largely served to preserve the hospital
association system.
103 Oregon State Federation of Labor. Year Bookfor Nineteen Hundred Twenty.
(Portland: Jolly-Ratelle, Printers, 1920), p. 37.
104 The report reads, "A committee appointed to draft a proposed amendment to the
Industrial Compensation Act will present a plan before the next session of the legislature,
permitting an injured employee the privilege of choosing his physician or surgeon. A
method will be devised by which such a right will be given the employee." ["Medical
Notes," Northwest Medicine, Vol. 19, No. 10, October 1920, p. 270.]
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Extra-Legislative Attempts to Eliminate the Hospital Associations and the Collapse ofthe
OrSFL-OSMS Coalition
The Oregon legislature continued to hear anti-hospital association bills proposed
after 1921. In 1923, for example, Senator Charles Hall of Coos County proposed Senate
Bill No. 142. This bill would have made the deduction of hospital fees unlawful in all
circumstances, except when sixty percent of a business's employees petitioned for that
business to enter into a contract "with a certain physician or physicians" for the provision
of medical aid. 105 The Hall bill certainly would have satisfied the demand that OrSFL
made during the Committee of Fifteen's 1920 meetings for employee voice in the
selection of hospital plans. It also may have satisfied the medical society's opposition to
hospital associations, for the bill explicitly permitted only contracts with individual
physicians or groups of physicians. Hospital associations were usually business groups
which hired physicians, and so any contract with a hospital association would not satisfy
the bill's requirements. Neither the state medical society nor the OrSFL was probably the
driving force behind the bill, however.
According to Oregon Voter's analysis, the Hall bill arose out of a Coos County-
centered conflict between a group of physicians who failed to secure hospital contracts,
and Dr. George E. Dix, who had for some time kept the largest contract with the Coos
Bay Lumber Company. The doctors who were excluded from the contract system took
105 Oregon. Senate. Senate Bill No. 142, Thirty-Second Legislative Assembly, Regular
Session, Feb. 1, 1923.
56
advantage of volatile labor conditions to encourage complaints against Dr. Dix. 106 After
a SIAC investigation turned up nothing negative about Dix's practice, the doctors hired a
solicitor to circulate a petition requesting the abolishment of the contract system. The
Hall bill was the result of this petition. I07
Hall's bill quickly died in committee. On February 15, 1923, the Senate
Committee on Industries issued a majority report, signed by four of the committee's five
members, recommending that the bill not pass. Senator Hall was the sole author and
signer of his minority report, and following the adoption of the majority report, the bill
was indefinitely postponed. 108 The bill's death was no loss to OrSFL, however. By this
time, the federation had adopted its new strategy of taking the hospital association dispute
directly to the people. Ultimately, this approach would prove no more successful than
pursuing claims in the legislature, and it would open a rift between OrSFL and OSMS
which would only make legislative attempts more difficult.
In September, 1923, OrSFL took its first steps toward fulfilling its goal of
creating a state insurance system when it passed a resolution asking Oregon Governor
Pierce to appoint a committee to consider changes to the workmen's compensation
system. At the committee's first meeting, Commissioner William Marshall expressed his
106 Incidentally, Wincent [sic] Smith of Smith v. State Industrial Accident Commission
was a patient of Dr. George E. Dix. Nothing in the trial court transcripts indicates that
Smith's case was definitely part of the Coos Bay situation. The connection does seem
highly probable, though.
107 "Contract M.D. System," Oregon Voter, Vol. 40, No., Jan. 17, 1925, pp. 202-204.
108 State of Oregon. Journals of the Senate and House of the Thirty-Second Legislative
Assembly. Salem, Oregon: State Printing Department, 1923, p. 179.
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goal of creating a compulsory compensation act. Under the then-current system,
employers sought out the cheapest rates, and employees suffered as a result. The solution,
Marshall argued, was to eliminate the casualty insurance companies' roles in the
workmen's compensation system, and to require all companies covered under the act to
insure with SIAC. 109
The coverage of the committee's meetings in Oregon Voter, Northwest Medicine,
and the Oregon State Federation ofLabor Yearbook does not clearly reveal its activities.
Briefs published in Oregon Voter, opposing the committee's proposals, argued that the
workmen's compensation fund should not be political. Under an exclusively state-
managed fund, politics would interfere with the efficient management of the fund, a
Special Committee from the Portland Fire Insurance Exchange and Insurance Federation
of Oregon argued. 110 Although the revision committee's opponents may have
exaggerated their claims, the committee probably did pursue Marshall's goal of a
monopolistic state fund and the elimination of the casualty insurance companies from the
market.
Even without transcripts of the committee's proceedings, one thing is clear: the
committee was completely unsuccessful at producing any recommendations for change.
Regarding the committee's activities, an article in Northwest Medicine stated that it "was
109 "Making Act Monopolistic," Oregon Voter, Vol. 35, No. 12, Dec. 22, 1923, pp. 374-
378.
110 "Brief and Argument in Opposition to Monopolistic State Insurance of Workmen's
Compensation," Oregon Voter, Vol. 36, No. 10, March 8,1924, pp. 301-318.
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found impossible to agree on any proposed measure."lll The degree to which physicians
were actually included in the committee's activities is a matter for debate. llZ The
Northwest Medicine report, however, seems accurate on this point: the committee
produced no recommendations.
Ultimately, OrSFL took the matter into its own hands, and presented the matter to
the people as an initiative petition for the November, 1924 general election. Through
amending the Oregon State constitution, the petition aimed to achieve several labor goals.
Most important for the hospital associations was the measure's third paragraph, which
stated, "It is unlawful for any employer to contract for, deduct from, or receive any
money for contract doctors, or medical, surgical, or hospital attendance or attention ... "
Under narrow circumstances, the amendment exempted from its rules isolated work
camps which would otherwise receive no medical support. The measure's most
controversial provision, however, was its expansion of SIAC powers: the initiative
authorized SIAC to make all rules and regulations necessary to enforce it. Furthermore,
any legislative attempt to overturn a SIAC ruling would automatically go to the people on
referendum. This rule reflected OrSFL's skepticism of the legislative process, and its
III "Is it State Medicine?" Northwest Medicine, Vol. 23, No.9, Sept., 1924, p. 419.
Northwest Medicine described the conference as including representatives of
labor, industry, and medicine. ["Is it State Medicine?" p. 419] Oregon Voter, however,
reported that the committee included representatives of employers, employees, and the
general public, exactly along the same lines of the 1920 committee and the group that
drafted the original 1913 workmen's compensation act. ["Making Act Monopolistic," p.
374.] Furthermore, the OrSFL Executive Board pointed out that the physicians were not
invited to participate in the conference at all. [Oregon State Federation of Labor, Year
Book for 1925, 1925, p. 18]
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hope that it could achieve its goals through initiative petition. It also, however, played a
significant part in the measure's November death.
Oregon's voters resoundingly defeated the measure when it appeared on the
November 4, 1924 ballot. The Secretary of State reported only 73,370 votes in favor of
the initiative, compared with 151,862 against. I13 The OrSFL's loss hardly came as a
surprise: two days before the election, The Oregonian predicted the measure's defeat.
The chief argument against the measure, according to the newspaper, was that "the
proposed amendment will place the whole responsibility in the hands of three political
appointees, responsible to no one except the governor who appoints them and they cannot
even be curbed by the legislature.,,114 The hospital associations' opponents would not be
able to defeat contract medicine through legal means outside of the state legislature.
The November 4th loss had another important consequence: the OrSFL's new
strategy decimated its tentative coalition with OSMS. The state medical society did not
actually completely oppose the measure. According to an editorial in Northwest
Medicine, many parts of the amendment were good. The problem, however, was that it
contemplated a substantial extension of the industrial insurance act to all citizens of the
state. Thus, the amendment was actually "a wedge for the establishment of state
medicine, with all its objectionable features ... "IIS The Oregon Public Health League's
I13 State of Oregon. Blue Book and Official Directory, 1925-1926 (Salem: State Printing
Department, 1925), p. 53.
114 "Muddy Campaign Closes in Oregon," The Oregonian, Nov. 2, 1924, p. 10, col. 1.
liS "Is it State Medicine?" Northwest Medicine, Vol. 23, No.9, Sept., 1924, p. 419.
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statement on the measure confirms that the medical profession opposed it over concerns
about state medicine. 116 According to the League, the amendment would "declare the
social concept to be that compensation for work accidents, adequate medical and surgical
service, and vocational rehabilitation is peculiarly a function of the state and not a
business for private profit [SiC].,,117 The League's statement was hardly a ringing
endorsement of the hospital associations' method of doing business. The associations
and the medical societies, if only temporarily, found some limited ideological common
ground over the issue of state involvement in the market for medical services.
The injury to the OSMS-OrSFL coalition went beyond the issue of state medicine. At
the OrSFL's 1924 convention, the federation's executive board expressed its anger over
the medical society's opposition to the measure. The "principal reason given by them,"
the board declared, "was that representatives of the medical profession had not been
called into conference by the governor when his committee was appointed, and had not
been consulted later when the amendment was drafted." I 18 The medical society gave a
different explanation, but whatever the true reason was, the hospital association issue
devolved into a struggle between the two groups. No longer enjoying the medical
116 The Public Health League was a separate body from the Oregon State Medical
Society. The two organizations drew from the same general body for members, and
according to Northwest Medicine, the league was "a vital factor in the medical and health
considerations of the states of the Pacific Northwest." ["The Oregon Plan for the Public
Health League," Northwest Medicine, Vol. 23, No.9, Sept., 1924, p. 419]
117 "Public Health Leagues: Oregon," Northwest Medicine, Vol. 23, No.9, Sept., 1924, p.
436.
118 Oregon State Federation of Labor, Year Book/or 1925,1925, p. 18.
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society's support, OrSFL turned to their irregular rivals, the Oregon State Association of
Naturopaths, Inc. (OSAN)
The naturopaths were quick to exploit the OrSFL-OSMS division to gain traction in
their own fight against organized, regular medicine. Dr. Henry Collins spoke for OSAN
at the OrSFL convention in 1924, attempting to enlist support for another bill on the
November ballot, which would give naturopaths full rights as licensed physicians. 119
Collins declared, "Our training, as you will notice, is as good as the surgeon, but the
surgeon has his place. We have ours ... We only desire an equality of privileges that you
have.,,120 Collins' speech was well-received by the delegates, who, in their search for
new partners, passed a resolution calling for the passage of the Naturopath Bill.
Immediately before the vote on the resolution, a delegate compared the medical
profession to the Standard Oil Company: "This is one of the biggest combinations in the
country-this medical profession," the delegate declared. 121 The resolution to support
the Naturopath Bill passed with only one vote in opposition.
The Naturopath Bill, like the workmen's compensation amendment, failed on
November 4, 1924. Thus, by the end of 1924, OrSFL had failed to eliminate the hospital
associations through both the legislative process and initiative petition. Furthermore, it
had destroyed the tentative coalition which had previously existed between it and OSMS.
119 For more information on the "Naturopath Bill," see: "Naturopath Bill," Oregon Voter,
Vol. 39, No.5, Nov. 1, 1924, pp. 25-26.
120 Oregon State Federation of Labor, Year Bookfor 1925, 1925, p. 32.
121 Ibid., p. 46.
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The coalition had been unable to bring about change in the legislature, but without it,
neither group stood a significant chance at eliminating the hospital associations.
Following the 1924 debacle, the hospital association largely disappeared from the
agendas of both the state legislature and OrSFL for the next several years. A slight
exception to this was a set of hearings on workmen's compensation under State Senator
Gus Moser between 1926 and 1927. The federation was not enthusiastic about the Moser
committee to begin with. The OrSFL executive committee reported, "After having
conferred with members of the Industrial Accident Commission... , we decided not to call
a conference, as it was feared that the desired results could not be obtained under present
conditions.,,122 Thus, when the 1925 legislative assembly appointed the committee under
Concurrent Resolution No. 14, OrSFL was skeptical ofthe potential results. 123
Nevertheless, OrSFL did make a request at the committee's hearings for an exclusive
state fund and the elimination of contract practice. The medical society did not back
OrSFL up at all: it recommended no drastic changes, and merely suggested that SIAC
appoint an advisory committee including at least three physician members. 124 The
122 Oregon State Federation of Labor, Year Bookfor 1927,1927, p. 7.
123 Oregon State Federation of Labor, Year Bookfor 1927,1927, p. 7; Oregon.
Legislative Workmen's Compensation Committee of the State of Oregon. Report ofthe
Legislative Workmen's Compensation Committee ofthe State ofOregon, 1927, Oregon
State Archives. Accession.
124 Ibid., pp. 104-105, 190-196.
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committee limited its final recommendations to budgetary matters, and issued no
recommendation concerning hospital associations. 125
Conclusion
As the prosperity of the 1920s ended and the Great Depression commenced, any
realistic hope of resolving the hospital association issue through the legislative process
was gone. Several factors had contributed to this. First, the structure and rules of the
legislature thwarted any attempts at reform by the anti-hospital association forces. In
both 1919 and 1921, individual committees killed legislation that might otherwise have
passed. In 1919, for example, H.B. 445 passed the House with a clear majority before
Senators Smith and Wood played key roles in eliminating it in committee. Second, the
constantly-shifting anti-hospital association coalition demonstrated significant lack of
internal agreement over key issues. For example, labor interpreted free choice of
physician to mean freedom to choose any medical practitioner. The difference between
organized medicine and organized labor on this point became clear when OrSFL chose to
support the naturopaths in the 1924 general election. Furthermore, any cooperation
between OrSFL and the insurance companies must have eroded in that same election.
The insurance companies probably played a role in the 1919 legislative battles, but they
certainly would not have partnered with OrSFL after 1924. Third, the substantial lack of
unity within the medical profession would have made organized medicine an ineffective
partner for OrSFL even had the naturopath bill not come between the two groups.
125 Ibid.,pp.1-5.
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Contract doctors' participation in the medical society's policy formulation efforts during
the 1920s contributed to its inability to articulate and defend clear stances, especially
when those same contract doctors were members of the Oregon legislature. These three
factors multiplied together to create a situation in which the hospital associations'
opponents really could not upset the 1917 arrangements that they so bitterly detested.
Over the decade, the anti-hospital association forces had become aware that the
legislature was not the only venue for resolving their complaints. In 1924, OrSFL went
directly to the people, albeit unsuccessfully. Those labor groups outside of the AFL did
not enjoy the same level of access to the formal political process, and necessarily used
other tactics. Senator Hall's statements in the Moser Committee meetings alluded to this.
Referring to the monthly collection of fees, he stated, "[T]his is a practice that is causing
very considerable irritation and contributes very largely to radicalism and that sort of
thing among employes.,,126 Extra-legislative efforts had yet to prominence by 1929. Not
long after, however, the Oregon State Medical Society would adopt a strategy of
attempting to resolve the hospital association issue in the private sector.
126 Oregon. Legislative Workmen's Compensation Committee of the State of Oregon.
Report ofthe Legislative Workmen's Compensation Committee ofthe State ofOregon, p.
73.
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CHAPTER III
THE PRIVATE SECTOR SOLUTION: THE OREGON STATE MEDICAL SOCIETY
CONFRONTS CONTRACT MEDICINE, 1931-1936
Evidently the human mechanism is not fitting into the processes of the assembly line is
such a way as to produce the best results. It may seem unkind that we have here another
example of the layman's confusions and contradictions when he attempts to combine his
medical knowledge with his social and economic knowledge.
- Bureau of Medical Economics, American Medical Association, 1935
If corporate responsibility is to be barred from contributing to the solution of the
problems involved in the cost of medical care for all the people, the trend will fix itself,
we fear, towards what doctors fear most - Social Medicine, with its potentialities for evil.
Oregon Voter Magazine, 1936
As the 1930s opened, the Oregon State Medical Society seemed to pick up the
contract medicine issue where the Oregon State Federation of Labor had left off. With
OSMS as the new leading player, the debate changed dramatically. In the 1920s, the
question was one of how much regulation the hospital associations would be subject to,
and which public regulatory body would be responsible for overseeing contract medicine.
As the medical societies imposed their new strategy, however, the issue became not one
of how regulation would be shaped in the public sphere, but instead one of whether the
prepaid medical services market would be regulated by public statutes or private codes.
Medical Ethics and the Challenges ofthe 1930s
Medical societies entered the 1930s profoundly aware of contract medicine's
challenge to their professional position. This challenge prompted the American Medical
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Association to produce series of studies on the ethical issues behind group payment plans.
In addition, the AMA cooperated with other groups to survey the new economic terrain.
Most famously, the Committee on the Costs of Medical Care, a group ofleading
physicians, public health specialists, and economists organized in 1927, collaborated with
the National Bureau of Economic Research to make a study of "the extent to which the
people of the United States make use of the principle of insurance in order to secure
medical and hospital care.,,127 The collaboration resulted in a widely-cited 1932 volume,
The Purchase ofMedical Care Through Fixed Periodic Payments, identified as one of
the first reports to discuss organized payments for medical services and to review then-
current approaches. 128
Why did the medical profession become so interested in the ethics of medical
payment plans in the 1930s? The AMA studies suggest a few related explanations. First,
the period saw the emergence of new forms of contract practice. In 1932, the NBER
determined that most group payment plans were restricted to lumber, mining, and railroad
camps. Group payment and contract medicine grew "out of the isolation of the
communities in which workers live.,,129 Despite contract medicine's relative isolation,
however, the NBER noted that private group clinics, community health associations, non-
127 Williams, Pierce. The Purchase ofMedical Care Through Fixed Periodic Payment
(National Bureau of Economic Research, 1932), v., accessed at
http://www.nber.org/books/will32-1.
128 See, for example: Bureau of Cooperative Medicine. "New Plans of Medical Service:
Examples of Organized Local Plans of Providing or Paying for Medical Services in the
United States," (New York City, 1940), p. 3.
129 W'll' 2I lams, p. .
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profit community hospitals, and medical benefit corporations had begun to emerge in
urban areas. A 1939 AMA study, Organized Payments for Medical Services, also dated
the beginnings of urban group hospitalization plans around the end of 1931.130
Second, the Great Depression itself created a renewed interest in sickness
insurance. According to Organized Payments, while public interest in sickness insurance
"seemed to have almost disappeared" during the 1920s, it was "more acutely aroused
after the industrial crisis of 1929 and the succeeding severe depression.,,131 For example,
hospitals which overextended themselves in the 1920s adopted prepayment plans as a
means of dealing with the vastly increased demand for free services by poverty-stricken
patients. 132 The AMA also identified the federal government's response to the
Depression as a related factor in promoting contract medicine. The medical societies
believed that they had been on the verge of victory over contract medicine in 1933. "The
criticism directed by organized medicine against contract doctors," Organized Payments
claimed, "were so thoroughly supported by factual data... that there was little objection
in most cases to its abolition.,,133 The federal government's involvement in local relief,
130 American Medical Association. Bureau of Medical Economics. "Organized
Payments for Medical Service." (Chicago, Illinois, 1939), p. 154.
131 Ibid., p. 13.
132 Ibid., p. 18.
133 Ibid., p. 33.
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however, resulted in "renewed attempts to restore contract poor doctors as part of the
medical machinery of relief.,,134
Third, the expansion and urbanization of contract medicine represented a direct
challenge to the medical societies. The NBER, allegedly taking a neutral stance, argued
that the new urban plans "[q]uite definitely [represented] attempts to modify the
traditional basis of medical economics.,,135 A 1935 AMA report, Medical Relations
Under Workmen's Compensation, spelled out in detail how this attempt to modify the
traditional basis of medical economics worked. Originally, contract medicine had filled
an unmet need: medical professionals did not serve the isolated logging, mining, and
railroad camps. Thus, companies made medical contracts to serve their workers'
occupation-specific medical needs. The medical societies, of course, had criticized
company-hired contract doctors on many counts, but not until they "steadily and almost
stealthily" left the isolation of the camps to enter the "great cities" did they pose a serious
challenge to organized medicine. As contract medicine assumed its new urban role, it
expanded beyond the provision of first aid, accident prevention, and employment
examinations to provide complete medical services to families. This expansion, the
AMA argued, "brought the industrial physician into sharp and subsidized competition
with the private practitioner and led to bitter conflicts in many localities.,,136 The medical
134 Ibid.
135 Williams, p. 216.
136 American Medical Association. Bureau of Medical Economics. "Medical Relations
Under Workmen's Compensation." (Chicago, Illinois, 1935 Revision), p. 122.
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societies, therefore, probably developed their strong interest in the ethics of contract
medicine in response to the economic challenges it posed to organized medicine.
The AMA's main point of attack, however, was not on contract medicine's
economic challenge to society physicians, but rather its ethical problems. In a 1932
article in the Journal ofthe American Medical Association, for example, R.O. Leland
framed the problem as purely ethical. Contract medicine, he conceded, was not new, but
it was expanding and assuming new forms using unethical approaches. Ethically-sound
contract medicine was possible, but its soundness depended on its administrative integrity
and the motives underlying its operation. 137 These requirements, of course, were rarely
met, and the AMA was quick to point out the contract doctors' failings. The AMA
singled out Oregon and Washington contract medicine in particular in Medical Relations:
"In Washington and Oregon, at least, contract practice, centering around compensation,
has developed to a point where it threatens at once the economic and the ethical
foundations of the profession.,,138
Organized medicine summarized the profession's "ethical foundations" in the
Principles ofMedical Ethics ofthe American Medical Association, first proposed in 1847.
The Principles underwent substantial revision between 1847 and the 193Os, but its
fundamental idea remained the same: the primary goal of medicine was service to
humanity, not profit. The Principles} other provisions grew out of this idea. For example,
137 R.O. Leland, "Contract Practice." (Reprinted from lAMA, March 5, 1932, Vol. 98,
808-815), pp. 1, 3.
138 American Medical Association. Bureau of Medical Economics. "Medical
Relations," p. 133.
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the profession rejected sectarian knowledge because it restricted inquiry, and in doing so
compromised the quality of medical care: "The channels by which new ideas increase the
general fund of medical knowledge should not be narrowed by sectarian theories," the
AMA argued in its 1936 pamphlet, Economics and the Ethics ofMedicine. 139 Similarly,
the Principles prohibited doctors from accepting rebates on prescriptions and surgical
appliances: physicians' judgments should not be financially-based, but instead centered
around delivering the highest-quality care possible to the patient. J40
Behind the anti-rebate provision lay another, closely-related principle: if the
medical provider's financial interests came to the surface, the patient's confidence in his
or her physician would be destroyed, potentially delaying or preventing recovery. 141 The
patient-physician relationship, the AMA held, was paramount. Thus, medical ethics
required that the patient have free choice "among equally qualified" physicians. Free
choice would advance the individual patient's interests through heightened confidence in
the physician, but it would also benefit society: through competition in which quality of
care was the sole measurement, the best physicians would float to the top, ultimately
advancing the entire profession. 142 Perhaps the medical ethics of the 1930s was best
summarized by three words: quality, not cost.
139 American Medical Association. Bureau of Medical Economics. "Economics and the
Ethics of Medicine." (Chicago, Illinois, 1936) p. 16.
140 Ibid., p. 31.
141 Ibid.
142 American Medical Association. Bureau of Medical Economics. "Medical
Relations," p. 66.
71
Contract medicine generally failed the test of medical ethics on three counts. First,
it distorted the patient-physician relationship. Patients were often assigned to physicians
without any personal choice in the matter. This lack of choice, the AMA claimed in
Organized Payments, tended "to destroy the value of the information necessary for good
medical care.,,143 The obvious result would be delayed recovery and indirect injury to the
patient. In addition to restricting free choice, contract medicine introduced a third party
into the patient-physician relationship. Hospital associations, R.O. Leland argued in
1932, were really business offices that employed physicians: "It is not uncommon for
these czaristic adjusters to dictate to physicians the extent to which their services shall go
in an individual case.,,144 Contract medicine often went against the principles of medical
ethics by interfering with the decisions which should have been made between the patient
and the physician.
Contract medicine's second flaw was its failure to carry out the fundamental idea
behind medical ethics: contract medicine did not promote public welfare. Through its
original exclusion of non-contract physicians from the care of injured workmen, contract
medicine slowed the development of occupational health as a field of medicine.
Contract medicine also divided the medical profession. The division weakened the
medical profession politically, preventing it from effectively lobbying the legislature on
workmen's compensation matters. If the situation further deteriorated, the AMA warned
143 American Medical Association. Bureau of Medical Economics. "Organized
Payments," p. 32.
144 Leland, p. 4.
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in Medical Relations, America might go the way of Europe: "In the European experience,
the economic organization, no longer backed by a united profession, became more and
more helpless to defend itself against the encroachments of "business necessities" until it
was almost the literal slave, economically and scientifically, of business interests.,,145 A
business-dominated medical system would hardly be in the public interest, the AMA
posited.
The third flaw behind contract medicine was indeed its emphasis on business-type
measurements instead of the quality measurements preferred under the Principles of
Medical Ethics. The AMA's opposition to advertising and solicitation, which the
hospital associations unabashedly used, illustrates this point well. "The effectiveness of
medical advertising," the AMA wrote in Economics and the Ethics ofMedicine, "is not
judged by the quality of the service but by the number of patients attracted by the
advertisement.,,146 Medical ethics accepted competition as absolutely vital to medical
advancement, but this competition had to be based on the actual quality of the care
provided. Advertising distorted the competition by substituting what organized medicine
deemed to be the irrelevant factors of cost and number of patients.
Medical ethics very clearly rejected the business world's emphasis on cost. To
what extent, however, did economic factors guide medical ethics? The AMA conceded
that cost and compensation of the physician were important concerns, even though they
145 American Medical Association. Bureau of Medical Economics. "Medical
Relations," pp. 141-142.
146 American Medical Association. Bureau of Medical Economics. "Economics and the
Ethics of Medicine," p. 19
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had to be subordinate to quality and the promotion of the public good. In Economics and
Ethics, the AMA wrote, "Good medical service cannot be expected unless society
appreciates the value of such service sufficiently to reward properly the type of young
men who can and will give good service. But it is equally true that a profession that
seeks first financial reward will lose its survival value and perish.,,147 Economics and
ethics, in other words, enjoyed a tangled relationship to one another. The promotion of
the public good would be impossible without at least some attention to medical costs and
physician incomes.
The medical societies' approach to indigent care illustrates the AMA's
complicated relationship to economic and business matters. In Organized Payments, the
AMA defined "indigents" as "those who have been declared by some public or private
investigating body as being incapable of providing themselves with the essentials of
life.,,148 Long before the 1930s, the Principles of Medical Ethics declared that physicians
had a professional obligation to provide gratuitous care to the indigent. The profession
hardly welcomed contract medicine's attempts to share in this responsibility after 1932,
however. Contract medicine, the AMA claimed, unduly restricted the indigents' "choice
of a physician chiefly because of their economic status.,,149 Under physician-provided
147 Ibid., p. 11.
148 American Medical Association. Bureau of Medical Economics. "Organized
Payments," p. 28.
149 Ibid., p. 32.
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care, of course, those unable to pay would still be able to choose among all of the local
medical society's upstanding and responsible members.
The issue, however, was not purely an ethical one. When medical societies
eventually developed their own payment plans, they included filtering mechanisms to
ensure that only low-income patients received services. The Medical-Dental Service
Bureau, established in early 1935 in Delaware and Washington, D.C., included such a
filtering mechanism. The Bureau only exercised administrative responsibilities: it
investigated each new patient's economic status, determined his or her ability to pay, and
worked out an installment plan to collect the bills. It also accepted patients referred by
the Central Admitting Bureau for Hospitals, "a filter system to determine the economic
status of persons deserving free hospital services.,,150 In line with medical ethics'
prohibition on advertising, the Bureau did not advertise or make any attempt to contact
prospective patients. Both the advertising restrictions and especially the filtering
mechanism ensured not only that medical society physicians shared equally the financial
losses from gratuitous services, but that they also continued to receive payments from the
well-to-do, who would be unable to enroll in the less-expensive prepaid plans.
Non-medical-society-sponsored plans earned the AMA's scorn. Even medical
groups which provided quality service, R.G. Leland argued, demonstrated antipathy to
organized medicine, showed a lack of interest in medical charity, and tried to influence
the companies they served to petition the state legislatures to maintain the contract
150 Ibid., pp. 93-94.
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system. "This attitude," he wrote, "is held by many contract physicians.,,151 Furthermore,
the medical groups' low rates implied that the medical profession charged too much. 152
Leland's writings show that the medical societies were extremely concerned about the
economic, and not only the ethical, challenges of contract medicine. By creating
divisions among doctors and by not properly sharing in the costs of indigent care,
contract medicine cost the profession money.
The medical societies' approach to indigent care shows just how complicated the
ethical-economic problem was. Both the Leland argument and the activities of the
Washington, D.C., Medical-Dental Service Bureau demonstrate concerns over cost.
However, the Medical-Dental Service Bureau did preserve patient choice of physician,
and kept the administrative side of the group out of the patient-physician relationship by
restricting its role to only financial matters. Furthermore, had the medical societies
completely ignored costs, they would eventually have been unable to serve the public
good for want of financial resources.
To claim that organized medicine was only out to make money in the 1930s
seems to be a stretch. The medical societies were, however, extremely conscious of
protecting their position in society at large. The AMA's discussion of medical ethics in
Economics and the Ethics ofMedicine shows that the medical societies were extremely
aware of the challenges that they faced, and that they accepted the use of medical ethics
as be a weapon against their opponents. Every ethical code, the AMA pointed out, was
151 Leland, p. 5.
152 Ibid., p. 16.
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promulgated by a group: "It is the creator and enforcer of ethical standards peculiar to its
members.,,153 An ethical code occupied an important place within any group as the
source of its strength and stability: because the greater society's attitude toward the group
depended upon the value the community placed on that group's service to society, the
group needed to maintain a good public image through membership standards. If the
medical profession failed to adhere to its code of ethics, business elements might
introduce conflicts into the group.
If unable to defend its value to society, the medical profession might eventually
go the way of the craft and merchant guilds: "Personal relations between producers and
consumers and status within guild organizations became of less importance than
commodity relations in exchange and contract relations within the organization of
production and marketing.,,154 If the medical societies became subservient to cost and if
they allowed medical businesses to trample on the patient-physician relationship,
eventually society would see no reason to support the professional group's existence.
The medical profession could suffer the same misfortune as the guild organizations: loss
of personal control over their product. To maintain economic and professional control
over medical services, therefore, the medical societies had to follow the code of ethics.
The code of medical ethics, of course, had a major weakness. In 1926,
philosopher Carl F. Taeusch pointed out that medical societies themselves actually had
153 American Medical Association. Bureau of Medical Economics. "Economics and the
Ethics of Medicine," p. 64
154 Ibid., p. 69.
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very little formal control over medical behavior: the United States legal system had the
final say. Compounding the problem further, the average 1920s physician tended to
neglect his political and social obligations: "He lets matters run on until election,"
Taeusch claimed, "or until he becomes interested in a particular program and then
discovers how impotent he is in the face of an organized system, the members of which
regularly attend ward meetings, hold political caucuses, and swelter in conventions.,,155
If the medical societies hoped to defend their professional terrain, Taeusch suggested,
they would have to do so through the political and legal systems.
Curiously, the medical societies showed a remarkable lack of interest in defending
their position by regulatory legislation through the state legislatures in the 1930s. In
Medical Relations, the AMA rejected state regulation as the solution to the contract
medicine problem: "In spite of [the State of Washington's] provision for closer regulation,
the industrial commission has never seemed to accomplish much in controlling and
regulating contract medical practice."I56 The reason for regulation's failure to rein in
contract medicine? "All the economic motives are against good service," the AMA
argued.
The AMA may have publicly blamed contract medicine's underlying economic
motives. The association's discussion of workmen's compensation politics, however,
indicates that the AMA recognized its own impotence in the state legislatures. During
155 Carl F. Taeusch, Professional and Business Ethics (New York: Henry Holt and Co.,
1926), p. 179.
156 American Medical Association. Bureau of Medical Economics. "Medical
Relations," pp. 129-130.
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the workmen's compensation system's formative years, the AMA conceded, the
physicians and workers "whose condition was to be most deeply affected by the
operation of the compensation system seem to have been largely indifferent to the actions
being taken and blind to their possible effects.,,157 Even if the medical profession was at
fault for failing to adequately participate in the original enactment of workmen's
compensation, however, they had little to gain from involving themselves in the
amendment process. That process would yield only legislation favorable to "the interests
that were involved in the originallegislation.,,158
If the medical societies rejected political solutions to the contract medicine issue,
how would they solve it? A comment in Economics and the Ethics ofMedicine
suggested the answer: "Group solidarity requires some machinery for the adjustment of
inevitable disagreements. The legislative and judicial machinery of the state is not
suitable for this purpose. The laws the state is formed to enact do not enter into the
details of professional ethics and disputes." I 59 The medical societies possessed their own
machinery and their own code. They would solve the issue in the private sector by
forming their own "ethically-sound" group plans to compete with the contract doctors,
and by revoking medical society membership from those physicians who failed to adhere
to their interpretation of the principles of medical ethics.
157 Ibid., p. 18.
158 Ibid., p. 21.
159 American Medical Association. Bureau of Medical Economics. "Economics and the
Ethics of Medicine," p. 41
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Founding the Multnomah Industrial Health Association
At the outset of the 1930s, the Oregon State Medical Society demonstrated a fresh
interest in what appeared to be political solutions to the contract medicine problem. In
his aptly-titled October 1931 address to the society's fifty-seventh annual meeting,
OSMS President Dr. Thomas E. Griffith laid out what he perceived as the "Problems
Before the State Society." The Great Depression, he argued, put citizens "in a mood
receptive to the appeal of the various nostrums and remedies promulgated daily.,,160 He
referred not to the patent medicines which the profession had been fighting for years, but
rather to the system of "paternal or state medicine." Blaming social workers, industry
leaders, and philanthropists for their role in promoting the system, Griffith remarked that
the rise of commercialized medicine had led to a "barrage of accusations ... , the most
important of which is that of "the high cost of medical care."" Almost definitely failing
consciously to differentiate contract medicine from state medicine, he remarked that the
most serious result of the system's increasing prominence was its material effect on the
"economic problems of physicians both individually and nationally.,,161
Griffith proposed three solutions to the issues that the system created. First, he
proposed that medical societies assume an enlarged role in directing the activities of
social welfare bureaus. Under the direction of local medical societies, the bureaus could
eliminate "the extension of charitable service to individuals able to pay a reasonable
160 Thomas E. Griffith, "Problems Before the State Society," Northwest Medicine, Vol.
XXX, No. 12, p. 552.
161 Ibid., p. 553.
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fee.,,[62 Griffith referred, of course, to the filtering mechanisms later popularized in the
AMA's literature on medical economics. By restricting charitable (and inexpensive)
services to only those completely unable to pay, the profession would ensure that it
maintained a considerable revenue stream in the depths of the Great Depression.
Second, Griffith cautioned the local medical societies to maintain a unified public
front. "By minimizing our internal problems through friendly intercourse and group
discussions," he said, "and by the proper interpretation of our ethical standards and
obligations one to another, we will develop a spirit of collaboration and solidarity among
our members which will enable us to render logical conclusions in the solution of our
major problems.,,[63 Griffith referred to the same problem Carl Tauesch had pointed out
in 1926: the medical societies had practically no formal control over physicians.
Furthermore, Griffith carefully chose to use the word "proper" in discussing the
interpretation of the code of ethics. Quite some time would pass before the medical
societies would publicly issue a statement of their policies toward medical payment plans,
let alone reach a consensus on the exact application of the code of ethics to the new
conditions of the 1930s. Looking ahead in the new decade, however, both the Oregon
State Medical Society and their president were acutely aware of how important it would
be to reach an internal accord on the contract medicine issue.
Finally, Griffith argued that the state and county medical societies needed to
increase their participation in Oregon state politics:
162 Ibid.
[63 Ibid.
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The county units can render valuable assistance to the State Society in the field of
politics. In the past, physicians have been extremely careful to remain aloof from
any and all matters relating to politics. However, we are learning that to secure
legislative enactments or amendments, we must interest ourselves and, through
personal touch with our legislators or possible candidates, ascertain their views
upon proposed legislation beneficial to the people of our state and to our
profession. 164
On the surface, Griffith's proposal appeared to be public-minded. The state medical
society and its constituent county societies would take its problems to the state legislature,
where an accord acceptable to the state's citizens could be reached. As it later turned out,
however, the state and county medical societies did not clearly accept the compromises
inherent to the political process. While organized medicine did come to occupy a
powerful position in the state legislature, it relied mainly on private sector solutions to the
problem of contract medicine, possibly contravening state public policy.
Not long after Griffith's address, OSMS's constituent county societies began to
experiment with their own hospital association plans. This approach to the contract
medicine issue was relatively new. An August, 1931 report to the Washington State
Medical Society on medical economics described how such a plan might work:
Another plan, yet untried, is a service by organized medicine. Here the county
society contracts to take a group at a fixed monthly rate per individual. Doctors
are called in rotation or free choice of doctors is extended to the insured
group.,,165
Individual members of the Multnomah County Medical Society, a local OSMS unit,
followed up on this idea shortly thereafter. In February 1933, these members formed the
164 Ibid.
165 "Medical Economics: Report of the Committee of Seven," Northwest Medicine, Vol.
31, No.4, p. 203.
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Multnomah Industrial Health Association (MIHA). By July 1934, MIHA included 206
physicians, including seven in nearby Washington County. In November of the next year,
the association had another 29 physicians and a total of approximately 6,000 subscribers,
all of whom had annual incomes at or below $1800, and many of whom contracted
directly with MIHA instead of through an employer. By January 1936, MIHA claimed
yet another 1000 subscribers. 166
According to a later editorial in Northwest Medicine, the journal of the Oregon,
Washington, Idaho, and Pacific Northwest Medical Associations, MIHA's founders
intended to achieve several goals. First, the founders attempted to meet the problems of
the Great Depression by providing prepayment of medical services for low-income
employees. Second, they planned to create an alternative to the lay-owned hospital
associations: MIHA would be physician-owned, and its patients would be able to charge
from a large panel of physicians, preserving the all-important patient-doctor relationship.
Finally, and most importantly, MIHA would allow organized medicine to successfully
compete with the proprietary hospital associations: "It was hoped that ultimately the
commercial hospital associations, with their solicitation of patients, might be driven from
the field.,,167 Ultimately, this objective would form the crux of the private market
166 American Medical Association. Bureau of Medical Economics. "Medical
Relations," pp. 61-63; Multnomah Industrial Health Association, "Bulletin No.7" ;
Multnomah Industrial Health Association, "Bulletin No. 13"
167 "Editorial: The Hospital Association Situation in Portland," Northwest Medicine, Vol.
35, No.8, p. 316.
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solution: organized medicine would attempt to meet the challenges of contract medicine
not primarily through politics, but instead through economic competition. 168
Oregon and Washington appear to have been on the leading edge in terms of
developing physician-controlled contract practices. In a 1940 article for the Federal
Security Agency, Louis S. Reed stated that the first medical society plans were
established between 193 1 and 1933 in Oregon and Washington, and remarked that "until
recently they stood alone."I69 Indeed, OSMS approached MIHA and other local plans
exceedingly cautiously. In 1932, the OSMS Committee of the Study of Health and
Accident Insurance by the State Medical Society advised that organized medicine stay
out of the insurance business on the state level. The local plans would serve as
laboratories. "We advise," the Committee wrote, "that the Council of the Oregon State
Medical Society observe these organizations and if successful encourage either a
federation or an arrangement for cooperation among the different groups ... ,,170 The
Multnomah County Medical Society (MCMS) was similarly cautious: the society made
its endorsement of MIHA contingent upon the association's acceptance of a set of
168 Pierce Williams' 1932 NBER report corroborates this point. He writes, "Increase in
the number of private group clinics is evidence of recognition on the part of the medical
profession of the need for an improved form of organization for rendering efficient
medical service ... [M]edical men are supplying valuable experience by which further
developments in the field of medical insurance can be tested." [Williams, p. 31]
169 Louis S. Reed, Costs and Benefits Under Prepayment Medical Service Plans (Federal
Security Agency: Social Security Board, Washington, D.C., 1940), p. 2.
170 "Minutes of the Fifty-Eighth Annual Meeting of Oregon State Medical Society, Sept.
22-23-24,1932," Northwest Medicine, Vol. 31, No. 12, p. 586.
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principles of operation. And for a short time, MCMS remained satisfied that MIHA
upheld these principles. 171
Problems Arise
Multnomah Industrial Hospital Association's honeymoon was short-lived.
According to Northwest Medicine's editorial staff, three factors undermined the
association's relationship with MCMS. First, competition with the commercial hospital
associations forced MIHA "to advise employers and employees regarding their
organization." This, of course, was a blatant violation of the Code of Ethics' prohibition
on solicitation. Second, the medical society's council saw a change in membership, and
became more hostile to MIHA's activities. 172 Finally, and most importantly, MIHA
entered into a contract with Portland-area public school teachers. The contract explicitly
limited coverage to those teachers who made at or under $1800 annually, but many
society physicians felt that the income level should have been capped at $1500. 173
171 "Editorial: The Hospital Association Situation in Portland." Northwest Medicine, Vol.
35, No.8, p. 316.
172 The membership changes actually worked both ways. For example, on October 14,
1935, Dr. Banner R. Brooke resigned from MIHA. The next year he would playa critical
role in the fight against the association as MCMS president. That year, Dr. Tharald
Tharaldson, a former MCMS president, would resign his MCMS membership in protest
of the society's treatment of contract doctors. In all likelihood, at least some of the
conflict flowed out of discontent with compensation physicians received through MIHA
and the proprietary hospital associations.
173 Ibid.
85
In direct response to the MIHA situation, MCMS convened a Committee on the
Study of Medical Care for Low-Income Persons under the chairmanship of Karl H.
Martzloff. The committee had three principal tasks: (1) to study differences of opinion
within MCMS regarding the hospital association issue; (2) to issue recommendations on
how to apply the American Medical Association's "Ten Principles" of medical ethics to
MIHA; and (3) to consider general issues around low-income medical care. In October
1935, the committee issued what would be commonly referred to in both the lay and
medical presses as "the Martzloff report." 174
The committee drew several conclusions from its analysis ofMIHA's operations.
The "most vital defect," of course, was the association's violation of medical ethics
through advertising and solicitation of patients. The committee leveled other accusations
at MIHA, as well. First, the maximum annual income that MIHA set for subscribers was
chosen arbitrarily, without adequate study. By fixing the maximum annual income at
$1800, MIHA allowed executives and school teachers to enroll in their plans. Non-
MIHA doctors suffered as a direct result: those executives and school teachers who
ordinarily would have patronized MCMS physicians took their illnesses to MIHA instead,
and paid a reduced rate for it.
Second, MIHA failed to achieve its primary objective of successfully competing
with the commercial hospital associations. The committee concluded that MIHA actually
had "no appreciable effect on the proprietary hospital associations," largely because it
174 Committee on the Study of Medical Care for Low-Income Persons, "Report to the
Council of the Multnomah County Medical Society," October 1935. OHSU Archives,
MSS
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drew its patients largely from groups which had never before been brought under medical
care contracts. Rather than depleting the proprietary associations' patient rolls, MIHA
actually further advanced contract medicine: through its reduced rates, MIHA created the
impression that medical care could be purchased at a low price, and that the society
physicians' usual charges were exorbitant. Of course, quality care could not be
purchased at such a low price, and the committee noted the decreased quality and
increased morbidity rates among MIHA patients.
Third, despite MCMS's nominal approval of the association, MIHA really
operated without sufficient Society control. Not all of the society members participated
in the association. Mainly the older, better-established doctors benefited from the patient
loads, when young, newer physicians should have received patients from the MIHA rolls.
"It seems apparent," the committee wrote, "that any plan changing the method of
delivering medical service to any class in the community, affecting, as it must, the entire
medical profession, should be under close and immediate supervision by the local
medical society." The association's many defects, they reasoned, were "due in
considerable part to the absence of such control.,,175
The committee struggled to offer a viable alternative to MIHA's plan. They did,
however, develop a set of fundamental principles for developing a plan of care for low-
wage workers. An ethical plan, they suggested, would be under complete society control.
Furthermore, all society members would be permitted and encouraged to join in order to
spread the patient loads more equitably, and the plan would operate without solicitation
175 Ibid., p. 4.
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or advertising. The existing proprietary hospital associations, as well as MIHA, clearly
violated these principles. The committee thus recommended that MCMS express its
disapproval of its members' affiliation with these associations, "to the extent of expulsion
from the society, after present outstanding contracts have expired.,,176 Writing wishfully,
the committee suggested that the hospital associations could return whence they came:
the local medical society might approve of contracts in isolated rural districts which
would not otherwise receive medical service.
According to Northwest Medicine, the Martzloffreport divided MCMS members
into two camps. On one side were those opposed to any form of contract practice. On
the other side stood those who continued to have faith that MIHA could successfully
drive the proprietary hospital associations from the market. The council adopted the
MartzloffCommittee's recommendations, but because a considerable minority of the
society physicians dissented, and the issue was referended to the society's December 18,
1935 annual meeting. This meeting, too, failed to resolve the issue. The Northwest
Medicine editorial stafflater attributed the society's decision to further postpone its
resolution to the "high heat" of interest in the issue, which could only harm MCMS' s
general welfare. Thus, arguments over MIHA's status and the medical society's
approach to contract medicine continued over the following months.
Shortly after the contentious December 1935 MCMS meeting, the Oregon State
Medical Society stepped into the fray. No longer content to simply observe the local
society-sponsored medical service plans from afar, OSMS rejected the view that the only
176 Ibid., p. 9.
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way to compete with the proprietary hospital associations was "by employing the very
methods of obtaining patronage which ethical physicians have so long condemned."I77
The alternative was simple. As OSMS President Thomas Griffith had suggested just five
years before, the medical societies needed to present a unified front against the hospital
associations. At least one local society, OSMS observed, had achieved this unity,
"serving notice upon these associations that they will not attend the patients of these
organizations who have been obtained by unethical practices.,,178 This would be the first
prong of the private market solution: by restricting the supply of medical 'labor' available
to the hospital associations, the medical societies would squeeze them out of the market.
As Carl Taeusch argued in the 1920s, this first prong would prove difficult to
enforce. The medical societies had no formal control over medical behavior: licensing
authority belonged to the state, and the holding of a license was in no way dependent
upon membership in the state and local medical societies. Nevertheless, OSMS pressed
forward in its quest against contract medicine, recommending that every member be
supplied with a copy of the "Principles of Medical Ethics," and advising them that
society membership was contingent upon their acceptance of these principles.
The Multnomah Industrial Health Association made efforts to comply with the
state and county medical societies' requests that they abide by the Principles. On
177 Oregon State Medical Society, "Statement Concerning the Enforcement of the
Principles of Medical Ethics," Adopted by Council, Feb. 17, 1937. OHSU Archive.
Accession # 2008-015, Box 1, Folder 7 (Societies, Medical: Oregon State Medical
Society, General)
178 Ibid., p 5.
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December 9, 1935, prior to the contentious MCMS meeting on the 18th ofthat month,
MIHA's Board of Directors signaled their intent to cooperate with the society in defining
eligibility caps, advertising methods. The board also proposed that the medical society
council be given the power to select all candidates for director positions within the
association. 179 On July 1, 1936, the association cancelled all salesmen's contracts,
pending a ruling from the AMA's Judicial Council defining solicitation. 180 Concerning
the critical issue of the schoolteacher contracts, however, MIHA's Board of Trustees
approved a renewal ofthe contract, with the stipulation that no teacher earning above
$1800 annually would be accepted. 181
The association's actions were too little, and far too late. The society's state and
federal divisions, demonstrating their increased interest in the local experiments in
prepaid medicine, dispatched Dr. Morris Fishbein, editor of The Journal ofThe American
Medical Association, to Multnomah County. Fishbein delivered a series of lectures over
several days in June and July, 1936. In a talk to the Portland Chamber of Commerce
titled "Medicine and the Changing Social Order," Fishbein reiterated the common theme
of the doctor-patient relationship: the patient had to be "individualized," meaning that no
179 Dr. Eugene P. Owen, Letter to the Council of the Multnomah County Medical
Society, December 9, 1935.
180 Board of Directors, Multnomah Industrial Health Association, "Letter to Dr. Harold B.
Myers," September 25,1936, OHSU Archive, Accession # 2008-015.
181 Multnomah Industrial Health Association, "Meeting of Board of Directors," Portland,
Oregon, March 5,1936, OHSU Archive, Accession # 2008-015.
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commercial or political interests could be permitted to come between him and his
doctor. 182
Fishbein delivered a similar message to MCMS on July 4, 1936. Following his
speech, the society voted on two questions: the acceptance of the Martzloff report and the
withdrawal of society approval from MIHA I83 The affirmative vote supported the
council on both instances. Concerning the withdrawal ofMCMS's approval ofMIHA,
the society voted almost 2-to-l in favor of the council's position, with about 150 MIHA
and National Hospital Association-affiliated physicians dissenting. The results of the
vote did not immediately affect the 150 dissenters: the society did not move to remove
them from the AMA rolls. According to The Oregonian, however, "eventual revocation
of memberships was seen as a distinct possibility. The medical societies were aware that
revoking AMA membership did not affect the practitioner's state license, but predicted
that "hospital associations would be seriously crippled because no outside specialist
would violate the AMA's ban and accept a call for special work for an association
patient.,,184
The contemplated membership revocations were soon to follow. In November,
1936, MCMS suspended two physicians affiliated with the National Hospital
182 "Individualizing Patient Advocated by Fishbein," The Oregonian, June 30, 1936, p.
19, col. 2-3.
183 "Editorial: The Hospital Association Situation in Portland." Northwest Medicine, Vol.
35,No.8,p.317.
184 "Doctors Oppose Group Medicine," The Oregonian, July 5, 1935, p. 1, col. 1.
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Association. 18s Shortly thereafter, several physicians 'voluntarily' resigned their
memberships under significant pressure fro Society leadership. On the evening of
December 4, 1936, Dr. C.G. Sabin submitted his resignation to the Council. In his
remarks to the press, Dr. Sabin lambasted the society for undertaking "to destroy
institutions recognized and approved by state law through the indirect method of
unwarranted attacks upon reputable physicians who care for patients sent to them by
these hospital associations ... ,,186 With this comment, Sabin struck at the heart of the
'private sector solution.' Through its attack on individual physicians' decisions to care
for contract patients, the society directly violated the public policy of the State of Oregon.
In his official statement to the society, Dr. Sabin declared as much:
The state of Oregon adopted a public policy of encouraging such service to those
who could not otherwise enjoy proper care when the legislature of this state
enacted a law providing for hospital associations under state regulation... You
have now attempted to subvert the declared public policy of the state of Oregon
by assailing physicians and surgeons who care for patients sent to them by such
hospital associations. Your obvious purpose is to destroy the hospital associations
by denying them the services of competent physicians and surgeons. No
substitute service is offered by yoU. 187
Sabin's statement referred to the regulatory plan adopted by the State of Oregon through
the Hospital Association Act of 1917. That law, he suggested, attempted to solve two
185 "Group Medicine Wins Long Fight," The Oregonian, June 22,1939, p. 1, col. 1;
according to Northwest Medicine, the two physicians were actually expelled, and not
merely suspended. See: "Oregon Council and Other News Notes," Northwest Medicine,
Vol 36, No.1, p. 33. This detail is relatively unimportant, and neither source seems more
accurate than the other.
186 "Sabin Withdraws from Medic Unit," The Oregonian, December 5,1936, p. 1, col. 7.
187 "Sabin Withdraws from Medic Unit," The Oregonian, December 5,1936, p. 2, col. 4.
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issues. First, the state legislature, representing the citizens of the state, lent its support to
contract medicine as a legitimate means through which low-income patients could
receive medical care. Second, the law represented the political compromise over the
hospital association issue. These compromises, once signed into law, deserved the
respect of all the competing parties. The medical society's attempt to destroy the hospital
associations - even indirectly - violated the unspoken rules of this political process.
Two more resignations followed on the evening of December 5, 1936.
Apparently following Dr. Sabin's lead, Drs. JD Leonard and George R. Suckow left the
society. Their lawyer, Mr. W. Lair Thompson, echoed Sabin's statements from the night
before. He declared, "The medical society has a right to dislike the hospital association
idea, and it has a right to fight the growth of the system of 'prepaid medicine,' but it
ought to direct its attack against the system and the law that permits the system of
medical insurance - not against the doctors who treat the patients.,,188 Like Sabin,
Thompson argued that the contract medicine issue had to be resolved through public
policy, and not by the medical society's unilateral decision to suspend contract doctors.
Two more resignations followed over the next several days. On December 7,
1936, Dr. Tharald Tharaldsen, a former MCMS president, submitted his resignation. A
reporter for The Oregonian left no doubt that Tharaldsen and the three other doctors left
under fire: "The resignations presupposed action by the society's council to oust
188 "Doctors Resign; Conflict Rises," The Oregonian, December 6,1936, p. 19, col. 3.
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them... ,,189 A fifth doctor, Dr. Chester Moore, left the society on the evening of
December 15th , citing similar differences with MCMS policy.190
The medical society's ousters highlighted a key element of the private sector
solution, namely that the medical societies would try to restrict the supply of labor to the
hospital associations in an attempt to drive them out of business. This tactic was, of
course, markedly different from the goal of the 1932 experiments in competing with the
proprietary hospital associations by setting up physician-owned ones. The frenzy over
the issue in the lay press, however, obscured an important, gradually-evolving, second
element ofthe medical society's strategy.
The October 1935 Martzloff report first hinted at the second element of the
medical society's strategy in its recommendations to the MCMS council. In addition to
expressing disapproval of society members who affiliated themselves with the hospital
associations, the Martzloff committee recommended "that the Council institute
immediately a study of the present practice of the hospitals in granting special rates to
commercial hospital associations below the rates charged the private patients of our
members ... ,,191 By ending this practice, the medical society hoped to level the playing
field. The hospital associations, of course, were able to secure these rates by virtue of
189 "Fourth Doctors Resigns Society," The Oregonian, December 8, 1936, p. 1, col. 3.
190 "Medical Group Loses Another," The Oregonian, December 16, 1936, p. 1, col. 6;
"Fifth Doctor Quits Society," Portland Oregon News-Telegram, December 16, 1936, p. 9,
col. 1.
191 Committee on the Study of Medical Care for Low-Income Persons, "Report to the
Council of the Multnomah County Medical Society," October 1935, p. 9, OHSU
Archives, MSS
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their large patient bases. Unable to lock in their own volume discounts, the medical
society's first best chance was to eliminate these special rates.
The Martzloff committee also advanced another suggestion which ultimately
became one of the most controversial aspects of the medical society's battle against
contract medicine. The committee advised that the medical society attempt to convince
the hospitals "to make membership in the Multnomah County Medical Society one of the
requirements for staff membership."I92 The state medical society's February 17, 1936
Statement Concerning the Enforcement ofthe Principles ofMedical Ethics also reflected
these sentiments, and refined them into a petition to the House of Delegates of the
American Medical Association on April 1, 1936. The petition read, in part,
Resolved, that the Council on Medical Education and Hospitals, before granting
approval to hospitals for general internships or residencies in the several
specialties, shall first assure themselves that each and every staff member of any
hospital under consideration for such approval is conducting his practice in
accordance with the Principles of Medical Ethics, and that such hospital is not
granting special privileges to any of its staff members in the form of lower rates
for patients of such staff members. 193
According to the OSMS Committee on Medical Education and Hospitals, the block rates
that the proprietary hospital associations were able to secure resulted directly from their
doctors' "inclusion on the staffs of some hospitals.,,194
192 Ibid.
193 "Minutes of the Sixty-Second Annual Meeting of Oregon State Medical Society,"
Northwest Medicine, Vol. 35, No. 12, p. 470.
194 Ibid., p. 473.
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By excluding hospital association-affiliated physicians from hospital staffs, the
state medical society would achieve goals. First, they would eliminate the "pernicious"
block rates that they despised so much. Second, and perhaps more importantly, they
would control the site at which healthcare was delivered. The medical profession was
keenly aware that the means by which care was delivered was rapidly changing.
According to a 1936 speech by Idaho State Medical Association President J.B. Crampton,
reproduced in Northwest Medicine, the position of the family physician was declining.
At the same time, technological progress introduced "hundreds of sentimental,
semimedical workers, not fully trained as physicians" into medical processes. Hospital
staffs, heavily made up of these semi-skilled workers, were easily tricked into supporting
commercialized and state medicine, which Crampton argued "looks to them like a
mecca." To make matters worse, the physician's situation was exacerbated by the
modern family's increasing demand for hospitalization. 195 The OSMS petition took a
step toward alleviating the physician's pain: by threatening to restrict the supply of
crucial specialists to the hospitals, the medical societies would be able to exercise greater
control over the distribution site of modern medical care. The AMA House of Delegates
approved the petition, and it became an official AMA policy in mid-1936. 196
As the medical society developed and implemented its new strategy, the conflict
between organized medicine and contract doctors reached fever pitch. By mid-December,
195 J.H. Crampton, "The Spectre of State Medicine," Northwest Medicine, Vol. 35, No.
10, pp. 368-369.
196 "Minutes of the Sixty-Second Annual Meeting of Oregon State Medical Society,"
Northwest Medicine, Vol. 35, No. 12, p. 473.
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1936, the lay press clearly expected the issue to surface in the upcoming 1937 legislative
session. The Portland Oregon News-Telegram predicted that the medical societies would
sponsor legislation that would effectively "either wreck the associations outright or so tie
their hands that they can't operate.,,197 Failing that, the hospital associations could at
least expect the society "to make hospital association doctors the "black sheep" of the
medical profession." 198
Anticipating the upcoming battle, Oregon's large industries (those with total
workforces numbering at least 15,000) commissioned an industry survey concerning
contract practice. Oregon Business and Investors, Inc., the group primarily responsible
for carrying out the study, declared that it planned to exert its influence against any
legislation which would curtail their right to contract for medical aid. "Such curtailment
or prohibition would," they declared, "seriously interfere with the medical care problem
for large groups of employes, particularly in small communities where adequate service
might not otherwise be available." 199
On its surface, the hospital association issue became one primarily about how to
effectively and efficiently deliver medical care to low income patients. The Oregon
Voter Magazine, a political publication in which local industries and proprietary hospital
197 "Professions Will Fight in Legislature," Portland Oregon News-Telegram, December
19, 1936,p.2,col. 1.
198 Ibid.
199 "Employers for Contract Aid," Portland Oregon News-Telegram, December 23, 1936,
p. 7, col. 6; "Group Medical Care Favored, Says Young," The Oregonian, December 23,
1936, p. 12, col. 4.
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associations advertised heavily, defended the business practices the medical society had
attacked:
If corporate responsibility is to be barred from contributing to the solution of the
problems involved in the cost of medical care for all the people, the trend will fix
itself, we fear, towards what doctors fear most-Social Medicine, with its
potentialities for evil.2oo
By threatening to drive out the proprietary hospital associations, the medical society
would only hasten the growth of socialized medicine. Under a physician-dominated
system, patients resisted the high costs of medical care and delayed treatment until their
illnesses went beyond what modern medicine could achieve. The proprietary hospital
associations, on the other hand, were accessible due to their low annual rates.
Furthermore, the associations actually promoted patient choice. The AMA, of course,
had claimed that differences in physician quality were sufficient to promote patient
choice. Patients would simply approach the physicians who had reputations for
producing the best outcomes. According to Oregon Voter magazine, however, the
hospital associations actually provided more information to the patient: patients could
choose the hospital association with the best public image. Simply put, contract medicine
solved many of the problems of modern medical care, and the medical societies had no
good reason to interfere with a system that was already working.
200 "Doctors Fear Social Medicine," Oregon Voter, December 5, 1936, Vol. 87, No.1 0, p.
282.
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The Hospital Associations Fight Back: The 1937 Session a/the Oregon State Legislature
The surface-level debate over the best method for delivering medical care
obscured another, ultimately more important issue: where, how, and by whom would the
contract medicine issue be resolved? When the Oregon state legislature convened on
January 11,1937, the answer to these questions seemed clear: the contract medicine issue
would be resolved by the elected representatives ofthe people through agreed-upon
political procedures. Ultimately, however, the session failed to resolve the issue at all.
Instead, the medical societies and the leading proprietary hospital association, the
National Hospital Association, may have attempted to use the legislative session to gain
advantages in the private market.201
Contrary to popular expectation, the proprietary hospital associations, and not the
medical societies, were the ones to sponsor legislation. The National Hospital
Association put its weight behind four bills aimed directly at the medical society's two-
pronged strategy. First was a controversial package of three bills, House Bills 281 - 283,
amending the regulation of commercial hospital associations. Second was a single bill,
H.B. 352, concerning the right of physicians to practice in hospitals. The NHA's motives
in introducing the bills were not entirely clear, but the texts of the proposed legislation
201 Lest there be any doubt that the activity in the 1937 legislative session was related to
the medical society conflicts oflate 1936, see February 4, 1937 report in Portland
Oregon News-Telegram. The paper reported that the legislative battle was "the aftermath
of a controversy in Portland that divided the Multnomah Medical society and resulted in
the resignation of several doctors." ["Measures Stir Controversies," Portland Oregon
News-Telegram, February 4, 1937, p. 2, col. 5.]
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and reports of the committee meetings suggest a strategy with both offensive and
defensive components.
The NHA enlisted the help of Representative N. Ray Alber CD-Portland), an
attorney with ties to the lumber industry and a prominent member of the Oregon House,
to introduce House Bills 281 - 283 on February 4, 1937.202 House Bill 281 primarily
dealt with financial regulations. It increased the amount of capital stock required of a
new entrant to the prepaid medical services market from $5,000 to $10,000 and stipulated
that the capital be unimpaired. The bill also increased the surety bond that new
associations were required to file from $10,000 to $15,000. Additionally, H.B. 281
enhanced the state insurance commissioner's power to regulate hospital associations.
The existing code required the associations to file an annual report. The new legislation
would allow the commissioner to examine each association's financial condition "at least
once a year ... , and oftener, ifhe deems it prudent so to do.,,203 To enforce regulations,
the bill gave the insurance commissioner the power to revoke an association's right to
transact business in the state, subject to review by an administrative board, and
appealable to the Oregon circuit and supreme courts.2°4 Finally, the bill dramatically
expanded the scope of the activities which might be regulated. The already-existing code
classified hospital association activities as involving "professional, medical or hospital
202 "Who's Who in the House," Oregon Voter, Vol. 88, No.1, January 2, 1937, p. 43;
Oregon. House. House Calendar for the Thirty-Ninth Legislative Assembly, State
Printing Department, 1937.
203 Oregon. House. House Bill No. 281. Thirty-Ninth Legislative Assembly, 1937, p. 5.
204 Ibid., p. 6
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services and supplies as accidents or illness sustained [by employees] may require." The
bill proposed to eliminate this text from the code, replacing it with "hospital care, nursing,
dental service or any other care and attention contingent upon sickness or injury... ,,205
This amendment to the original regulations would bring the activities of the rapidly
urbanizing hospital associations under the commission's supervision.
House Bill 282 concerned the right of employers to make contracts with hospital
associations to provide medical care for their employees. Unlike H.B. 281, this bill
invested the state industrial accident commission (SIAC) with supervisory power over
hospital association contracts. The industrial accident commission, however, received far
less discretion in canceling contracts than the insurance commissioner did in H.B. 281.
House Bill 282 listed several factors which SIAC would have to look for in canceling a
contract: "the services being provided [under the contract] are not adequate and proper or
that the contracting party is not competent or qualified or has neglected or failed to
provide proper services and care of the injured workmen.,,206 Of course, SIAC's power
was limited to contracts made between employers and hospital associations. The
insurance commission, on the other hand, had the power to regulate all hospital
associations doing business in the state of Oregon.
House Bill 283 sanctioned employers' collection of fees for hospital association
contracts, but added in several protections for workers. Section 3 of the bill allowed a
worker to opt out by providing written notice to his employer. The section also dealt
205 Ibid., pp. 2-3.
206 Oregon. House. House Bill No. 282. Thirty-Ninth Legislative Assembly, 1937, p. 3.
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with the mobility problem expressed by the state federation of labor in the 1920s: under
H.B. 283, any employee who had paid a fee for any time period and left employment
before that time period elapsed would be issued a receipt and would be entitled to the
care he had paid for. 207 Section 6 imposed certain limits on solicitation, although those
limits did nothing to force a modification ofNHA's business practices. Finally, sections
8 and 9 enhanced the insurance commissioner's supervisory authority in the same manner
as done in H.B. 281.208
The day following the bills' introduction and first reading to the House on
February 4, 1937, the measures were referred to the House Committee on Medicine,
Pharmacy, and Dentistry.209 Controversy ensued over the next two weeks, and centered
mainly on the stock capital and surety bond requirements of H.B. 281, and the increased
scope of the insurance commissioner's regulatory authority in both H.B. 281 and H.B.
283.
In a meeting on February 8, 1937, two physician-members of the Committee on
Medicine, Pharmacy, and Dentistry charged that Alber's bills constituted an attempt by
the NHA to gain a greater market share at the expense of small hospital associations. Dr.
207 Oregon. House. House Bill No. 283. Thirty-Ninth Legislative Assembly, 1937, p. 2;
See also: "Public Meeting of the Legislative Workmen's Compensation Committee of the
State of Oregon," February 19,1926, Oregon State Archive, Box
208 The bill's author used a basic police power argument to support the insurance
commissioner's enhanced supervisory authority: the State has the ability to make laws to
promote the safety, health, morals, and general welfare of the citizens under police power.
209 Oregon. House. House Calendar for the Thirty-Ninth Legislative Assembly, State
Printing Department, 1937, p. 38.
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C.D. Hockett (R-Wallowa County) declared, "This is an attempt to create a
monopoly.,,210 Hockett's counterpart on the committee, Dr. J.F. Hosch (D-Deschutes),
said, "They're saying 'you little guys get out of the way and we big fellows who are
businessmen will run this, not you fellows who know something about medicine." Both
Hockett and Hosch referred to the proposed $5000 increase in bond and capital stock
requirements. The 'big fellows,' they believed, could meet the new requirements easily,
but the new regulations would drive smaller associations out of business. Neither
Hockett nor Hosch probably wanted to ensure a competitive, healthy market for the
proprietary hospital associations, however. Hosch clearly understood the physicians'
obligations to the medical society, stating, "If this bill goes out of this committee on a
divided report among the doctors, there'll be a h--l of a fight in the medical society.,,211
The medical society had already made its stance on proprietary hospital associations clear.
Therefore, Hockett and Hosch were most likely concerned about the power NHA might
wield if it succeeded in driving smaller hospital associations out of the market. Much of
the December 1936 drama inside of MCMS revolved around doctors affiliated with NHA,
and the medical society probably desperately wanted to block legislation which would
give NHA a leg up in the private market.
The National Hospital Association soon had its turn to defend the legislation. At
a committee meeting on the evening of February 10, A.E. Clark, attorney for NHA,
denied that H.B. 281 was an attempt to freeze out small companies:
210. "Governor Backs Mining Measure," The Oregonian, February 9,1937, p. 1, col. 5.
211 Ibid.
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I wish to deny the charge that increases are an attempt to freeze out the small
hospital companies. The obligations that a hospital association undertakes make
it necessary that there be sufficient guarantee that the contract to care for people
will be fulfilled. 212
Framing his argument in terms of corporate responsibility, Clark argued that the
increased surety bond and stock capital requirements were necessary for ensuring that
hospital associations would be able to fulfill the promises they made through their
contracts. Hosch expressed disagreement with Clark's assessment: why did the bill
establish a flat requirement? The discussion which followed suggested that H.B. 281
might have a chance of passing if the committee incorporated a sliding scale between big
and small associations, with the capital and bond requirements for the latter set
"fi 1 1 213slgm lcant y ower.
The February 10 meeting also brought forward the issue of which agency would
supervise the hospital associations. Unsurprisingly, Assistant Insurance Commission
Sehorn expressed approval of the bill which would enhance his department's regulatory
power. Hospital associations, he declared, were "something that have come to stay and
should be put on a dignified, substantial basis.,,214 In other words, the increased
regulations would actually benefit the proprietary hospital associations, for it would
confer upon them the state of Oregon's mark of approval. As the driving force behind
212 "Clark Appears for Hospitals at Legislature," Salem Capital Journal, February 11,
1937,p. 14, col. 1.
213 Ibid.,; "Backers Feature Hospital Hearing," The Oregonian, February 11, 1937, p. 11,
col. 6.
214 "Backers Feature Hospital Hearing."
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the bills, and as a company with close ties to the insurance department, NHA almost
definitely agreed with these sentiments.215
The Oregon State Federation of Labor (OrSFL) occupied a middle position at the
February 10 meeting, neither completely opposing nor completely supporting the bills.
For the federation, the issue of agency power was of paramount importance. Attorney
B.H. Green attended the meeting as the federation's representative. The insurance
commission, he argued, should not administer the act. Instead, the hospital associations
should be supervised by SIAC.216 Like the NHA position of enhancing the insurance
department's regulatory power, Green's argument was unsurprising. The federation had
cultivated a close relationship with the industrial accident commission: one member of
the commission was drawn from labor's ranks, and the OrSFL undoubtedly had close
215 The proprietary hospital associations' close connections with the insurance
department dated back to the formulation of the original hospital association regulations
passed in 1917. The Insurance Commissioner's correspondence files demonstrate that
the commissioner consulted with NHA in creating legislative proposals. A November 2,
1916 letter to the commissioner from C.C. Bechtold, General Manager of the National
Hospital Association, advises, "I am inclosing you herewith a proposed Section to the
Insurance Code relative to Hospiatl [sic] Association as per our conversation the early
part of this week." [C.C. Bechtold, Letter to the Insurance Commissioner, November 2,
1916, Oregon State Archives] The Insurance Commissioner replied several days later,
writing, "This is to advise that I will try and get the general committee to permit me to
make this part of the code, although several members objected to this and at a general
meeting recently the hospital association section was eliminated. However, if it does not
become a part of the code I personally will recommend it to the Legislature and request
that it become a part of the insurance code." [Insurance Commissioner, Letter to C.C.
Bechtold, November 6, 1916, Oregon State Archives]. Although the exact provisions in
question are missing from the records, the short exchange between Bechtold and the
Insurance Commissioner suggests that NHA probably supported enhanced regulatory
power for the insurance department because it could influence agency decision-making.
216 "Clark Appears for Hospitals at Legislature."
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contacts on the commission staff. Even if it does not serve as conclusive proof, the
exchange between Green, Sehorn, and Clark suggests that H.B. 281 reflected motivation
on the part of the NHA to place decision-making on some aspects of contract medicine in
an agency favorable to the proprietary hospital associations.
On February 16, opponents of the Alber bills had their chance to address the
House Committee. Dr. Richard Adams, a representative ofMCMS, attacked the
legislation vigorously. Repeating earlier criticism advanced by the medical profession's
members on the committee, Adams argued that the larger bond and capital stock outlays
required by the bill would push the contract medicine industry toward monopoly. "These
bills," he declared, "will further entrench corporate practice ofmedicine.,,217 Adams
framed his argument in terms of patient rights, stating that the medical society's "attack
on this bills is entirely in the patients' behalf. The laborer pays too much for too
little.,,218 Curiously, however, labor's main objection to the bills was that they enhanced
the insurance commission's regulatory power instead of SIAC's. Thus, the medical
societies were mostly likely more concerned about the impact an even more-powerful
NHA would have on organized medicine than the effect the bills would have on patient
care.
The committee met for a final time on the morning of February 17. After reading
a "do not pass" report to the clerk, the three Alber bills were pulled out of the committee
217 "Opponents of Hospital Bills Have Innings," Salem Capital Journal, February 17,
1937, p. 12, col. 4.
218 Ibid.
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by surprise and met decisive defeat on the House floor. Alber desperately tried to revive
his bills through a move to table and amend them, but the House shouted his motion
down by a loud "aye" vote.219
Ultimately, H.B.s 281-283 probably failed for two reasons. First, although the
bills contained a number of provisions amenable to labor, OrSFL was unwilling to trade
their influence in regulatory decision-making through SIAC for the employee protections
outlined in section 3 ofH.B. 283. Commenting on the events of February 17, pro-labor
Representative Phil Brady pointed out that labor deserved a say in hospital association
rates, and that this power should not be turned over completely to the insurance
commission. "[L]abor," he stated, "is in accord with the state industrial accident
commission.,,220 Second, the medical societies effectively controlled a sufficient number
of seats on the House Committee on Medicine, Pharmacy, and Dentistry to block
legislation that they opposed. The editors of Northwest Medicine praised Dr. Hockett's
service on the committee, and wrote favorably of the profession's service in the
legislature, remarking that the doctors "should be remembered as exerting effective
influence in the passing of favorable legislation and blocking objectionable bills.,,221
The medical profession may have participated in the legislative process, but its
actions did not suggest that it would seek a public resolution of the contract medicine
219 "Kill Three Bills for Hospital Association," Salem Capital Journal, February 17,
1937, p. 1, col. 3.
220 Ibid.
221 "Legislative Medical Acts," Northwest Medicine, April 1937, Vol. 36, No.4, pp. 136-
137.
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Issue. The defeat ofH.B.s 281-283 probably turned back an offensive action by the NHA.
Although the evidence as to motivation is inconclusive, the three Alber bills certainly
would have legitimated the large proprietary hospital associations and given them an
economic advantage over the medical societies. The fourth and final NHA proposal,
however, was largely a defensive reaction to medical society actions, and the physicians'
response to H.B. 352 suggests that the medical societies sought to continue to resolve the
contract medicine issue privately.
House Bill 352, introduced by the Committee on Medicine, Pharmacy, and Dentistry
on February 8,1937, made it unlawful "to deny the use of the facilities of any property
devoted to hospital purposes ... to any qualified and reputable physician or surgeon,
authorized to practice in this state, solely on the ground that he is not a member of any
local, state, or national medical society or association... ,,222 The medical societies, of
course, had no formal control over licensing, and the bill's preamble was quick to point
the state of Oregon' s authority on these matters. The bill targeted the medical societies'
previous attempts to control the sites at which healthcare was delivered, and gave their
victims legal remedies against them (action to recover damages, enjoinder). The Oregon
State Medical Society was keenly aware that H.B. 352 was a defensive move on the part
of the NHA:
This association also sponsored House Bill 352, to prevent the hospitals from
exercising control over the ethical standards of their staffs. This bill was designed
to render ineffective the resolution relating to the approval of hospitals for
222 Oregon. House. House Bill No. 352. Thirty-Ninth Legislative Assembly, 1937, p. 1.
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interneships [sic] and residencies which was adopted at the 1936 Session of the
American Medical Association.223
The OSMS's strategy, of course, was to restrict hospital access only to medical society-
affiliated physicians. Even in its early phases, the strategy clearly proved concerning to
the NHA, and thus H.B. 352 constituted a defensive move by the proprietary hospital
associations.
Once again, the medical society's legislative strategy worked to defeat the
measure. The bill was originally referred to the Committee on Legislation and Rules,
which appears to have been more favorable to NHA interests, for it rapidly reported it
back with the recommendation that it be considered on February 8. The next day, H.B.
352 was referred to the Committee on Medicine, Pharmacy and Dentistry, where the
physician members of the committee probably effectively killed it.224 Thus, the hospital
association issue continued to be decided by the medical societies' actions in the private
market. Contract medicine would not be dealt with through agreed-upon political
processes and rules.
Conclusion
By the mid-1930s, OSMS had successfully removed the hospital association issue
from the public sphere. In doing so, it substituted its own private code of ethics for
223 "Minutes of the Sixty-Third Annual Meeting of the Oregon State Medical Society,"
Northwest Medicine, Vol. 36, No. 12, p. 440.
224 Oregon. House. House Calendar for the Thirty-Ninth Legislative Assembly, State
Printing Department, 1937, p. 45.
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publicly voted-upon regulations. Two factors contributed to OSMS's success at this.
First, the medical societies themselves developed internal cohesion. Lack of agreement
over the permissibility of contract medicine had stymied legislative efforts against the
hospital associations in the 1920s. By threatening to expel hospital association-affiliated
physicians in 1935, the medical societies gained the level of internal control needed to
take a unified stance on the issue. Second, the very same procedural rules that protected
the hospital associations against organized labor and medicine in the 1920s finally
worked in favor of the physicians. The physicians obtained enough committee seats to
effectively block the hospital associations' attempts to use public regulation to defend
themselves. As the medical societies substituted their own rules through processes
available only to their members, and not the general public, the hospital associations
found it far harder to erect additional regulatory defenses than it previously was to block
undesirable legislation.
Having successfully defended its power to regulate the prepaid medical services
market through its private code of ethics, OSMS would continue and expand its private
sector strategy through 1949. Whether that period reflected a continuous policy on the
part of the medical societies, however, would eventually become the subject of debate
with serious implications for public policy concerning the regulation of prepaid medical
serVIces.
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CHAPTER IV
THE OREGON STATE MEDICAL SOCIETY BEFORE THE SUPREME COURT
Private codes of ethics are not a substitute for the law; and private regulation of prepaid
medical care business is not a substitute for the competitive principles of the Sherman
Act.
- United States Department of Justice, 1949
This Court has recognized that forms of competition usual in the business world may be
demoralizing to the ethical standards of a profession.
- United States Supreme Court, 1952
When the Oregon State Medical Society celebrated its victory at the 1937
legislative session, its private sector strategy against the hospital associations was really
only in its infancy. The next twelve years saw dramatic developments, which ultimately
brought the issue once again into the public sphere. In 1952, the United States Supreme
Court decided the case of United States v. Oregon State Medical Society, and in doing so,
validated the medical society's substitution of its private code of ethics for public
regulatory statutes.
The Medical Service Bureau Solution
The medical societies may have won their battles in the 1937 legislature, but they
had done nothing to deflect the criticisms leveled at them by Oregon Voter magazine, Dr.
e.G. Sabin, and countless other critics: they offered no viable alternative. Absent some
solution for the care of low-wage earners, the threat of social medicine still loomed large.
Thus, on July 20, 1937, OSMS took its fIrst steps toward developing a program to replace
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contract medicine. Hoping to have "something constructive to offer, if possible, at the
next session of the legislature," the Council of the OSMS voted to establish a committee
to "study the problems of contract practice in all local communities" and to develop
guidelines for the state and local societies for dealing with those problems.225
On April 2, 1938, the OSMS Committee on Medical Economics submitted two
reports to the OSMS council, arguing that prepaid low-income medical care was "here to
stay"; that the society should develop its own plans to replace those of the hospital
associations, both lay and physician-owned; and that OSMS should establish a group
hospitalization plan that would eventually include both workers and their families. After
discussing the reports, the council asked the committee to develop a statewide plan of
low-income medical care.226
After several months' work, the Committee on Medical Economics presented its
plan to the OSMS Council and Executive Committee on June 25. The Council shied
away from Committee's proposal for a statewide corporation to engage in contract
practice and directly compete with the proprietary hospital associations, however. In
place of the Committee's proposal, the Council substituted its own "Statement of Policy
and Program for the Medical Care of Low-Wage Industrial Groups." The Council
225 "Elimination of Contract Practice," Northwest Medicine, August, 1937, Vol. 36, No.
8, p. 288. Regarding the medical societies' awareness of the threat of social medicine,
see Northwest Medicine editorial for January, 1938: "The threat of state medicine which
looms on the horizon with varying intensity is a source of agitation which cannot be
suppressed." ["The New Year Outlook," Northwest Medicine, January, 1938, Vol. 37, No.
l,p.24.]
226 "Proceedings of April Council Meeting," Northwest Medicine, May, 1938, Vol. 37,
No.5, p. 157.
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approved the statement on August 6, and OSMS House of Delegates took up this
alternative proposal on August 24 at the state society's annual meeting.
The "Statement of Policy" took a deliberate and cautious approach.227 Unlike the
Committee's recommendation for a completely centralized group hospitalization plan, the
Council's August 25 statement reserved a certain degree of local autonomy for the county
medical societies. Instead of a statewide group hospitalization plan, each local medical
society would "be requested to indicate whether the problem of contract practice and the
medical care of the low-wage industrial groups in its local community is such as to make
desirable the organization of a special plan to provide medical care to such groups.,,228
Any local plans which were developed would remain completely within the county
medical society's jurisdictional boundaries, absent express permission by OSMS to
expand geographically. 229
The Council justified its preservation of local autonomy along three general lines.
First, in reference to the ongoing battles surrounding socialized medicine, it stated that a
statewide plan "could be readily seized upon by selfish politicians as the foundation for a
227 The report's preamble reads, "The medical profession of Oregon has reached a
crucial point. The decisions we make during this and the ensuing few years will
determine permanently the future of medical practice in this state. For this reason, it is
vital that we proceed deliberately and cautiously." ["Minutes ofthe Sixty-Fourth Annual
Meeting of Oregon State Medical Society," Northwest Medicine, Vol. 37, No. 11, p. 367.]
228 "Care of Low-Wage Earners by Oregon State Medical Society," Northwest Medicine,
Vol. 37, No.9, p. 302.
229 The official report does not indicate the contextual reasons for this restriction, but the
reader should recall that the Multnomah Industrial Health Association expanded into
Washington County not more than two years after its initial establishment.
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system of state-controlled medicine.,,230 Second, the transfer of state-level medical
society authority to an outside group responsible for administering the plan carried with it
certain risks. Most importantly, the society would lose direct control over the
enforcement of the principles of medical ethics. Furthermore, such a plan had the
potential to create dissension within OSMS ranks. The state medical society clearly
hoped to avoid a repeat of the 1936 MCMS debacle. Third, OSMS would lose its
"position... as an independent, censorial mechanism" if it approved a statewide plan?3l
This third and final objection served as the basis for the plan that the committee did
propose.232
The plan followed a structure similar to the delegation of power by a state
legislature to local governments?33 The state medical society would retain censorial
230 "Minutes of the Sixty-Fourth Annual Meeting of Oregon State Medical Society," p.
368. For general context, see: Paul Starr, The Social Transformation ofAmerican
Medicine (New York: Basic Books, 1982), pp. 280-289.
23l Ibid.
232 One additional reason for the medical society's caution may have been then-active
antitrust proceedings against the American Medical Association. At an April 2, 1938
meeting, the OSMS Council discussed United States House Resolution 452, which called
for an investigation of the AMA's attempt to interfere with Group Health Association,
Inc., a DC-based hospital association-like body. ["State Departments: Oregon,"
Northwest Medicine, May 1938, Vol. 37, No.5, p. 156]. That case eventually came
before the US Supreme Court as American Medical Assn. v. United States. Among other
things, the court held that the AMA was properly indicted and convicted of conspiring to
violate Section 3 of the Sherman Act. [American Medical Assn. v. United States, 317, U.S.
519 (1943)]
233 American legal theory holds that local governments are the creatures of the states.
The states are the fundamental units in American democracy, and both the federal and
local governments derive their powers from the states. Any power that the local
governments hold is delegated to them by the states. When delegating legislative power,
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control, disciplining those groups which violated the principles of medical ethics, and it
would also develop ethical standards and policies for the county medical societies to
follow in setting up their own group plans. Key to developing these standards would be a
new state Bureau of Medical Economics, which would be responsible for preparing
standard contracts, developing uniform accounting practices, drafting a uniform schedule
of rates, and guiding the local organization on the maximum income levels for
subscribers.
Following some late-night revisions, none of which affected the Council's
recommendations as outlined here, the House of Delegates adopted the plan on a vote
described as "unanimous, except that N.L. Tartar of Corvallis ... voted in the
negative ... ,,234 Surveying the society's work OSMS President Charles T. Sweeney
declared that the plan was the step which would do away with the worst features of
contract practice. Now at the end of the decade, however, Sweeney cautioned that the
medical societies faced the same situation they had at the beginning:
As long as we have a law on the statute books of the State of Oregon legalizing
hospital associations, and no matter by whom owned or how controlled, if they do
not break any laws, we will have, perhaps, that unpleasant, if I may say it,
competitor to contend with, but we should surely be able now to sell the laborers
and even the low-wage earners something better, something cleaner and
whether to a "fourth branch" agency or to a local government, the legislature must set
forth basic standards for the exercise of that power. The situation within OSMS with
regard to county medical plans was completely analogous. See: Osborne Reynolds,
Local Government Law (New York: West, 2009).
234 Ibid., p. 370.
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something that will retain that age old tradition of free choice of physician and
preserve that time-honored relation between physician and patient.235
The medical society may have prevented further entrenchment of the hospital
associations through their activities in the 1937 legislative session. Their failure to block
the 1917 Hospital Association Act through either inattention or inability, however, meant
that they would have to compete with the hospital associations in the private market.
In practice, the local plans followed the medical service bureau model developed
in Washington state some years before. These medical service bureaus were essentially
medical society-owned hospital associations, much like the Multnomah Industrial Health
Association was intended to be. In fact, MIHA was soon granted re-approval by MCMS:
in April 1937, the MCMS Board of Censors called a meeting to investigate the
complaints against MIHA, and found that the latter had both given up solicitation after
July 1, 1936 and had corrected the income cap problem that the Marztloff report had
objected to. To gain yet more support for society re-approval, MIHA called attention to
the anti-hospital association provisions of its bylaws, which forbid its members from
affiliating with commercial hospital associations. In October 1938, MCMS granted
MIHA - by then renamed the "Oregon Medical Service Bureau" - its approval as the sole
approved organization to provide medical care to low-wage industrial workers. In 1939,
235 Charles Sweeney, "New Plans for Medical Practice," Northwest Medicine, November,
1938, Vol. 37, No. 11, p. 348.
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the association underwent a final name change to become the Multnomah Medical
Service Bureau (MMSB), and won final MCMS approval.236
Not long after MIHA's rebirth as MMSB, the medical service bureau solution
began to exhibit some cracks. First, the county bureaus started to present territorial
disputes to the OSMS Council. For example, in 1940, the Benton County Medical
Society complained that MMSB was operating within the Benton society's jurisdiction.
A similar complaint cropped up in Linn County the next year, once again the supposed
fault ofMMSB. Second, OSMS discovered that demands for prepaid medical service did
not fit neatly within county borders. In February 1940, the OSMS Council considered a
request by the Oregon State Police to allow the Physicians and Surgeons Hospital
Association of Salem to serve its employees throughout the state. The Council approved
this petition.237 Pressure was mounting for the establishment of a statewide prepaid
medical care system.
Centralization and Competition, 1941-1949
The solution to the overlapping jurisdiction problem came in 1941, with the
founding of the Oregon Physicians' Service (OPS). That year, the OSMS Council
236 In the United States District Court, District of Oregon, Civil Action No. 4255. United
States v. Oregon State Medical Society. Trial Brief for the Plaintiff, pp. 106-108
(University of Oregon Special Collections Library)
237 Ibid., pp. 248-251.
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adopted a resolution to incorporate OPS, and donated $6000 in funds to start the plan.238
At least two factors contributed to this development. First, of course, was the medical
society's discovery that demands for medical services did not fit neatly within county
borders. Second, the production demands of World War II catalyzed already-existing
trends toward more widespread health coverage. Around 1943, Dr. Orlen Johnson of the
AMA's Council on Industrial Health remarked, "We recognize that there has been
changing concept of industrial health... and we are actively promoting a program which
is positive in character, to bring about an improved medical service in industry under the
leadership ofthe medical profession." The OSMS Service Bulletin recounted Johnson's
speech, reporting that he attributed the rapid change to the "the sudden development of
war industries [which] precipitated these problems far earlier than would otherwise have
happened. ,,239
OPS soon came to replace the medical service bureau model, although not
entirely. The official OSMS policy regarding OPS retained county medical society
control over prepaid medical service plans within county lines. Only with the county
medical society's consent could OPS extend its operations. Such consent was not
238 In the United States District Court, District of Oregon, Civil Action No. 4255. United
States v. Oregon State Medical Society. Trial Brief for the Plaintiff, pp. 30-34.
239 "Oregon is Changing," OSMS Service Bulletin, Nov. 1943, Oregon Health and
Science University Archives and Special Collections, Oregon State Medical Society
Records, Box 4, Folder 20: Prepaid Medicine (Including Oregon Physicians' Service).
See also: Carolyn M. Buan and Caroline P. Stoel, The First Duty: A History ofthe u.s.
District Court for Oregon, (Portland: U.S. District Court of Oregon Historical Society,
1993) pp. 193-194. Buan and Stoel argued that changes brought about by WWII were
largely responsible for the development of OPS.
118
impossible to obtain. In its first annual report, OPS declared that mergers with the
Southern Oregon Medical Society of Medford and the Physicians and Surgeons Hospital
Association of Salem were largely completed by the end of 1943.240 The merger between
OPS and the Multnomah Medical Service Bureau followed the next June, and the latter
was officially dissolved on June 26, 1944. By November 1944, OPS operated in all but
six counties, and employed 692 civilian and 191 military physicians on its open panel.241
At the height of its operations in December 1944, 90,000 workers subscribed to the
service, only to drop to approximately 76,000 by October 1945, a reduction which OPS
obviously anticipated with the de-escalation of the war.242
Had OSMS merely given its approval to, and funded OPS, the commercial
hospital associations would have had no legal recourse against the medical society.
Unhindered competition in the medical services market, however, was not enough for the
medical society. The medical society's strategy from 1936 had already proved its
effectiveness. For example, as Charles Pumphrey would later testify in Federal District
Court, the Pumphrey Company, a commercial hospital association, went out of business
240 "Oregon Physicians' Service: Summary ofIts First Annual Report and Outline of
Operation," OSMS Service Bulletin, Nov. 1943, p. 7, OHSU Archives and Special
Collections, Oregon State Medical Society Records, Box 4, Folder 20.
241 "Oregon Physicians' Service," OSMS Service Bulletin, Nov. 1944, OHSU Archives
and Special collections, Oregon State Medical Society Records, Box 4, Folder 20.
242 "Oregon Physicians' Service," OSMS Service Bulletin, Vol. 3, No.4, Nov. 1945, p. 2,
OHSU Archives and Special Collections, Oregon State Medical Society Records, Box 4,
Folder 20.
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in 1940 after it could not find doctors who would accept its tickets.243 New plans not
sponsored by the medical society soon arose to challenge OPS's position, however. One
such plan was Northern Permanente, the predecessor to the modern-day Kaiser
Permanente system. In May 1942, Edgar Kaiser, son of Kaiser shipyard owner Hemy
Kaiser, organized the Northern Permanente Foundation in Vancouver, Washington.
Permanente began operation in September of that year with a 70-bed hospital and clinic
next to the shipyards. By August 1943, the operation had grown to 330 beds. 244
The initial OPS reaction to the Permanente Foundation's founding does not
appear to have been overwhelmingly negative. The Service's presence in the Oregon
Kaiser shipyards had always been limited: the original OPS contract with Kaiser covered
medical service only (Blue Cross took responsibility for hospitalization).245 In March
1944, OPS transferred direct control of its first aid stations to Kaiser yard officials, and,
at least according to its own internal correspondence, realized substantial reductions in
243 "Medicine Trial Testimony Is Highlighted," Eugene Register Guard, Oct. 25, 1945, p.
15, col. 3. Online. Accessed 05/07/10. http://news.google.com. Concerning "taking"
tickets, the hospital associations eventually moved to a situation in which they basically
acted as insurers. Their clients presented tickets to approved physicians, who would fill
in the relevant details concerning treatments and submit to the hospital association for
payment.
244 "Northern Permanente Foundation," OHSU Archives and Special Collections,
Oregon State Medical Society Records, Box 8, Folder 14, News: Oregon Physicians'
Service.
245 "Oregon Physicians' Service: Summary of Its First Annual Report and Outline of
Operation," OSMS Service Bulletin, Nov. 1943
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first aid and administrative expenses?46 The Permanente Foundation's September 1944
expansion to offer off-the-job sickness and injury coverage and prepaid care for
employees' families also failed to provoke a negative reaction from the medical society.
In fact, the plan was formulated with the guidance and blessing of the Clark County
Medical Society, and received approval from the Washington State Medical Society and
the AMA. Neither OSMS nor OPS appear to have written negatively of the plan in their
. 1d 247mterna ocuments.
According the US Attorney General's later investigation of the situation, OSMS
and OPS began to strike out against the Permanente Foundation after the conclusion of
the war. At that time, Permanente expanded its plan beyond the Kaiser shipyards and
Clark County to build a clinic in Portland and a sales office in Vancouver, and to add
non-employee subscribers in both Oregon and Washington. In 1946, OSMS "issued a
blast against Permanente" and encouraged physicians to practice as members of MCMS
and OPS. The next year, OPS allegedly attempted to influence SIAC not to allow
contracts with Permanente. By 1947, OSMS had revived its old policy of threatening to
expel members who cooperated with rival medical service plans. The Attorney General's
office reported that OSMS refused to admit three Permanente doctors who applied for
membership in 1948 and 1949 after clearly stating such a policy. Other doctors, the
246 "Summary of Second Annual Report of Oregon Physicians' Service," O\Iot dated.
Estimated ~late 1944.) OHSU Archives and Special Collections, Oregon State Medical
Society Records, Box 8, Folder 14.
247 [Untitled], OHSU Archives and Special Collections, Oregon State Medical Society
Records, Box 8, Folder 14.
121
office alleged, refused to deal with non-society hospital associations after being the
subjects of an OSMS propaganda campaign?48
Even prior to the end of war, OSMS appears to have also revived its strategy of
controlling the site at which medical care was delivered. The National Hospital
Association's records include reports on two 1944 meetings between OPS and MCMS
officials and the Portland Council of Hospitals. The report declares that at the first of
these meetings, on January 31, OPS representative Dr. Gordon B. Leitch "proposed to the
hospitals that they refuse to accept patients sent to them by the casualty insurance
companies or any of the hospital associations except the Oregon Physicians Service or
other doctor owned associations." The NHA report further alleged that MCMS
threatened to refuse to send patients to those hospitals which failed to enter the plan, and
that those "present were especially cautioned to keep the meeting secret." When the
group reconvened on February 3, the physicians failed to bring the hospitals on board
with its plans. The majority of the hospitals' representatives opposed it, and those who
approved "stated that they would join in the plan provided it was accepted by all other
hospitals of the council." Although the plan appears to have been unsuccessful, the intent
was crystal-clear: according to the NHA report, the physicians declared that under the
plan, "the old established hospital associations could ... be eliminated and the field left
open for those associations which the doctors own and control." Once again, the medical
248 In the United States District Court, District of Oregon, Civil Action No. 4255. United
States v. Oregon State Medical Society. Trial Brief for the Plaintiff, pp. 140, 154-158.
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society's private sector solution to the hospital association issue was in full swing,
(supposedly) secret meetings and all. 249
At the Federal District Court for Oregon
The hospital association situation came to a head on October 18, 1949, when the
United States Department of Justice brought suit against the OSMS on behalf of the
hospital associations. On October 18, Federal District Judge Claude McColloch heard
the first day of testimony in the case of United States v. Oregon State Medical Society.
The DOJ charged that OSMS, OPS, the county medical societies, and a number of
individual physicians within those organizations had conspired to restrain trade and
attempted monopoly "on a broad scale" in contravention of sections 1 and 2 of the
Sherman Antitrust Act, and "to the detriment of the public.,,2s0
Congress passed the Sherman Act in 1890. According to Louis Galambos and
Joseph Pratt, the act originally aimed to restore free markets without increasing the size
of the government by striking at concentrated power through the already-established
judiciary instead of developing new administrative structures.zSI Section 1 ofthe act
declared "[e]very contract, combination in the form oftrust or otherwise, or conspiracy,
249 Report on meetings ofrepresentatives of the Multnomah County Medical Society and
the Oregon Physicians Service with Portland Council of Hospitals held on January 31 51
and February 3rd, 1944," Farwest American Assurance Records, Oregon Historical
Society, Mss 2863, Box 6 of8, Vol. 16,1949-1963
2S0 United States v. Oregon State Medical Society, Civil Action No. 4255, Brief for the
Government, Filed 10/10/49.
2S1 Louis Galambos and Joseph Pratt, The Rise ofthe Corporate Commonwealth, p. 57.
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in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States" to be illegal. The key to this
provision was that it limited antitrust actions to those attempts to restraint trade in
interstate markets. Section 2 prohibited monopolization and attempts at monopoly by
individuals, and also attempts at monopoly through combination and conspiracy?52
The government, represented in court by Special Assistant to the Attorney
General Philip Marcus, advanced three points against the defendants' activities. First,
Marcus argued that medical society's motives in attempting to interfere with the prepaid
medical services market were immaterial. "[T]he Sherman Act," he wrote, "prohibits
them from combining to enforce, through restraints and monopoly, their ideas of right
and wrong against others who differ with them. Private codes of ethics are not a
substitute for the law.,,253 Whether or not the medical societies acted benevolently, the
Sherman Act clearly forbade their conduct. Thus, the case fell within the meaning of the
act. Second, Marcus argued that the Sherman Act applied to the case, because the
physicians interfered with interstate commerce. Although many of the commercial
hospital associations operated only within Oregon's borders, drugs and medical supplies
flowed over those borders, and many policyholders hailed from outside of the state.
Marcus' third and final argument was the most contentious, and ultimately the
point on which the case turned. Having attempted to establish that the Sherman Act
applied to the case, Marcus now offered evidence that the defendants had indeed
252 United States v. Oregon State Med. Soc'y, 343 U.S. 326 (1952), footnote 3.
253 United States v. Oregon State Medical Society, Civil Action No. 4255, Brief for the
Government, Filed 10/10/49, p. 9.
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attempted to conspire to restrain trade and to monopolize the prepaid medical services
market. The key to the argument was Marcus' periodization of the events. He grouped
the medical societies activities into four periods. From 1930 to 1936, the medical
societies attempted to expel the proprietary hospital associations from the market through
the establishment ofMIHA. In 1936, the strategy took a new turn, as the medical
societies tried to take control over the supply of medical labor by threatening to expel
those physicians who cooperated with the hospital associations. From 1936 through 1941,
the medical societies continued to use the threat of expulsion to keep physicians in line,
and attempted to monopolize the prepaid medical services market through their county-
level medical services bureau. Finally, from 1941 to the date of the case, the physicians
continued this practice through the establishment of OPS.254 Because the government
sought an injunction against the medical societies, Marcus had to tie the 1936-1941 and
1941-present periods together. The most obvious evidence of conspiracy came from the
former period. Had the activity ceased to occur after 1941, the court would have nothing
to issue an injunction against. Thus, the entire case depended on the integrity of this
connection.255
254 In the United States District Court, District of Oregon, Civil Action No. 4255. United
States v. Oregon State Medical Society. Trial Brief for the Plaintiff, pp. 47-140.
255 OSMS's arguments are conspicuously absent from this narrative. Only the briefs for
the United States were available in the University of Oregon Special Collections Library.
Both the opinions of Judge McColloch and the United States Supreme Court probably
reflect OSMS's arguments. For limited information on the OSMS side of the
proceedings, see: "Organized Medicine Is on Trial," Tri City Herald, Oct. 10, 1949, p.
111, col. 1, Online, accessed 05/07/10, http://news.google.com.This article reveals that
Attorney Nicholas Jaureguy argued for OSMS.
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Judge McColloch immediately severed that very connection when he delivered
his opinion on September 28, 1950. The events were best grouped into two periods, he
argued: the time prior to the establishment of OPS in 1941, and the time following it.
Regarding the former, he wrote, "This period is ancient history. It has no legal or causal
connection with the period 1941 to date ... ,,256 Having settled that issue, McColloch
moved on to the only remaining question: whether the physicians violated anti-trust laws
through the formation of OPS. On this point, he stated, "I really doubt that the
Government believes the operations of Oregon Physicians' Service are monopolistic.,,257
OPS's major competitors, McColloch pointed out, were "tremendously profitable,"
whereas OPS itself faced "weaknesses inherent in cooperative enterprise.,,258
McColloch attempted to further reinforce his holding, however, by declaring that
the physicians' pre-194l activities did not violate the Sherman Act. He wrote,
"[D]efendant doctors and medical societies have not restrained or sought to restrain the
use of hospital facilities by others, except in cases of lawful and legitimate professional
discipline of individual doctors for unprofessional conduct detrimental to their patients, to
the hospitals, and to the public generally.,,259 McColloch's analysis of the pre-194l
period was, of course, completely unnecessary given his conclusion that the
256 United States District Court for Oregon. United States v. Oregon State Medical
Society, Civil Action No. 4255, Opinion, Findings and Notes, p. 2.
257 Ibid., pp. 2-3.
258 Ibid., p. 3.
259 Ibid., p. 4.
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establishment of OPS in 1941 did not constitute a continuation of previous monopolistic
practices, as the government had argued. Here, he sought to introduce a new rule into the
law. For the physicians' conduct to be "lawful and legitimate," McColloch had to treat
medicine as distinct from ordinary business and trade. He did just this, writing, "I will
make a finding and/or conclusion that the practice of medicine is not a trade within the
meaning of the Sherman Law.,,260 The case hardly turned on this issue, but on appeal, the
Supreme Court ofthe United States would consider and approve McColloch's holding.
In doing so, it would validate the physicians' private sector solution of the past twenty
years.
The Supreme Court Decides
Following its loss at the District Court level, the government appealed to the
United States Supreme Court. The Supreme Court heard oral arguments on the fourth
and seventh of January, 1952. Several months later, on April 28, 1952, Justice Robert
Houghwout Jackson delivered the opinion of the court.
The government's argument had four parts. First, the brief argued that Judge
McColloch's factual findings were erroneous. The appellees had in fact conspired to
restrain trade and monopolize the prepaid medical care business. The Supreme Court
rebuffed the government along civil procedure lines: Jackson wrote, "The direct appeal
procedure does not give us the benefit of review by a Court of Appeals of findings of
260 Ibid.
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fact.,,261 Second, the government attempted to show that OPS was engaged in "trade" or
"commerce" under the meaning of the Sherman Act. The court made no ruling on this
point, but it did rule against the government's third argument, that interstate commerce
was implicated. The court agreed with Judge McColloch's findings on this matter, but
also refused to try that question again based on prior precedent (United States v. Yellow
Cab CO.).262
Once again, the fatal blow was struck at the supposedly weak tie the government
drew between the pre- and post-1941 periods. Refusing the review the District Court's
interpretation of the evidence, the Supreme Court accepted McColloch's finding that the
appellees were not engaged in conspiracy to monopoly or restraint of trade after 1941.
The government asked for an injunction against OPS, OSMS, and the county societies,
and the court held that such a request was impossible to grant. The activity had ceased
long before, and therefore the injunction was impossible.
The government had already reversed its fourth argument at Federal District
Court. At the Supreme Court, the government tried once again to advance its argument
that the medical profession could not justify the restraints it imposed on the medical
services market as "reasonable on the ground that they were imposed in an effort to
261 United States v. Oregon State Medical Society, 343 U.S. 326 (1952), p. 330. Note
that the case reached the Supreme Court on direct appeal from the U.S. District Court for
Oregon. No Court of Appeals was actually involved in the case.
262 Ibid., p. 332.
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maintain asserted professional standards of medical ethics or otherwise.,,263 The
government's argument had two parts. First, it attacked the District Court's finding that
OSMS's unwillingness to cooperate with the commercial prepaid medical organizations
in certain practices was not a conspiracy to restrain or monopolize trade, but that it was
instead "for the purpose of maintaining the standards of medical practice.,,264 The
medical society stated that its motive was ethical, the government claimed, but it was
truly economic. For example, MCMS was very clear about its economic motives when it
approved the Multnomah Industrial Health Association, and these motives continued to
remain especially apparent through the two organizations' conflict over MIHA's
inclusion of teachers and other professionals who would have patronized society
physicians were it not for the low prepaid rates. For all its objections to solicitation at
and advertising, the government's brief went on, OSMS was very selective in its
application of its own code of medical ethics: OPS actively solicited patients and
advertised, and OSMS offered no objections. Finally, the medical society's purported
commitment to free choice of physician was a sham: OPS refused to include physicians
who had been expelled from OSMS.265 Beyond that, a patient's choice of physician was
limited by financially constraints.
263 United States v. Oregon State Medical Society. Argued 1951. Brief for the United
States, p. 2.
264 Ibid., p. 152.
265 Recall that medical society membership was not a requirement for licensure to
practice medicine under Oregon State law.
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The second part of the government's argument concerned the medical society's
authority to impose its private code of ethics on the medical services market, whether or
not its motives were truly ethical. This part of the argument drew on both statutory and
common law. On the statutory side of things, the government pointed out that OSMS had
"not been appointed by the state authorities as law enforcement agencies to police the
medical profession and eliminate all practices of which they did not approve.,,266 The
legislature specifically delegated the authority to regulate hospital associations to the
insurance commissioner. Absent legislative approval, actions in restraint of trade were
not permitted under common law, the government argued. According to Sugar Institute v.
United States, which concerned the sugar industry's attempt to deal with chaotic
conditions through a "cooperative endeavor," businesses were not permitted to violate the
provisions of the Sherman Act even to ameliorate "evils afflicting the industry... ,,267 The
court's decision in United States v. National Association ofReal Estate Boards (339 U.S.
485) further supported this point, the government contended. In that case, the
Washington Real Estate Board fixed fees in reference to its own code of ethics. The
court determined that such price fixing was an unreasonable restraint of trade, and that
the worthiness of the end it served was immaterial.
The court unceremoniously rejected the government's arguments against the
permissibility of OSMS's application of its code of ethics to the medical services market.
266 Ibid., P 153. Although this argument did not cite actual statutes, the appropriate
source of law is statutory: only through statutes can the legislature delegate its authority
in this manner.
267 Ibid, p. 155.
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"We might observe in passing," Justice Jackson wrote, "that there are ethical
considerations where the historic direct relationship between patient and physician is
involved which are quite different than the usual considerations prevailing in ordinary
commercial matters. ,,268 Because medicine was distinct from ordinary commerce, the
medical society's imposition of its code of ethics on the medical services market was
acceptable. The court cited the 1935 case of Semler v. Oregon State Board ofDental
Examiners (294 U.S. 608) in support of its position. Concerning Semler, Jackson wrote,
"This Court has recognized that forms of competition usual in the business world may be
demoralizing to the ethical standards of a profession. ,,269
The court's decision to cite Semler seems erroneous: the facts of Semler do not
support the court's application of its holding to United States v. Oregon State Medical
Society. Semler concerned the validity of a 1933 Oregon statute regulating the
professional conduct of dentists. Prior to 1933, Oregon law allowed the revocation of
licenses for unprofessional conduct, defined as advertising in an untruthful or misleading
manner. When the legislature passed the 1933 Act, it provided for additional grounds for
revoking a license. Not only were misleading statements prohibited: a dentist could also
lose his license for employing a solicitor, mounting "glaring light signs," or advertising
prices for professional services. A dentist brought suit against the Oregon State Board of
Dental Examiners (OSBDE), seeking an injunction against the enforcement of the statute
on the grounds that it violated his Fourteenth Amendment rights of due process and equal
268 United States v. Oregon State Med. Soc 'y, 343 U.S. 326 (1952), p. 336.
269 Ibid.
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protection, and that it impaired the obligation of contracts he had made with solicitors, in
contravention of the Commerce Clause. The court quickly dismissed the equal protection
and commerce clause claims, arguing that "the regulation of his conduct as a dentist is
not an unreasonable exercise of the protective power of the state.',270
The court then went on to deal with the due process claim. The court asked
whether the restrictions amounted "to an arbitrary interference with liberty and
property... " In deciding this issue, it held that the regulations fell within the state's
police power.27I This power extended beyond that which allowed the original anti-false
advertising regulations. The court wrote,
And the community is concerned in providing safeguards not only against
deception, but against practices which would tend to demoralize the profession by
forcing its members into unseemly rivalry which would enlarge the opportunities
of the least scrupulous. What is generally called the "ethics" of the profession is
but the consensus of expert opinion as to the necessity of such standards.272
The key to the court's conclusion was not that dentists were justified in applying their
code on ethical grounds. Instead, the logic operated as follows: the legislature had the
power to regulate on matters concerning general welfare, health, safety, and morals under
its police power. Experts concluded that the code was necessary for preventing
demoralization among dentists. Demoralization among dentists would injure the general
270 Semler v. Oregon State Board ofDental Examiners, 294 U.S. 608 (1935), p. 610.
271 Police power refers to the power to regulate on matters concerning general welfare,
health, safety, and morals. See: Richard Briffault and Laurie Reynolds, State and Local
Government Law (West, 2010)
272 Ibid., p. 612.
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welfare, health, safety, and morals of the citizens. Thus, the state had the power to apply
the dentists' code of ethics within its regulatory framework.
The OSMS case was completely distinct from Semler. First, the dentists applied
their code of ethics through the legislative process, whereas OSMS imposed it privately.
Semler never legitimized private application. Second, the legislature actually delegated
the power to regulate dentistry to OSBDE, a body composed of dentists. The legislature
never delegated the power to regulate medicine to OSMS. Finally, the OSBDE enjoyed
the power to revoke licenses, whereas OSMS did not. Any attempt by OSBDE to prevent
entry into the market for the supply of dental services was legally sanctioned. The same
did not apply to OSMS's attempts to control the medical services market through
expulsions from the state and county medical societies.
In its holding in United States v. Oregon State Medical Society, the Supreme
Court took a stance on the medical ethics issue that it had largely sidestepped in
American Medical Assn. v. United States. In that case, the AMA, as defendants, urged
the court to decide that a physician's practice of his profession did not constitute trade
under Section 3 of the Sherman Act. The court refused to consider this question on the
grounds that the Group Health Association was engaged in business, and thus the AMA
violated the Sherman Act regardless of the nature of its own members' professions.273
273 American Medical Assn. v. United States, 317 US 519 (1943), p. 528. The AMA case
had a special twist to it: Section 3 of the Sherman Antitrust Act allowed claims against
practices within the District of Columbia. This case fell under section 3. The
government would not have had a justiciable claim had the case fallen in any other
jurisdiction, as the physician's actions did not implicate interstate commerce.
133
Thus, the court's holding in United States v. Oregon State Medical Society set a new
precedent, and masked a slight deviation from its Semler decision.
Conclusion
April 28, 1952, marked the day when the Oregon State Medical Society's private
sector approach to the hospital association issue gained complete legitimacy. The
strategy, of course, had developed over two decades, and even had the court sided against
the medical societies, the damage had already been done. The Supreme Court's opinion
was, in many ways, unnecessary. It marked a departure from previous precedent, and the
court could easily have sidestepped the issue. Nevertheless, the case marked an end to a
decades-long dispute, and validated the physicians' private sector solution.
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CHAPTER V
CONCLUSION
The medical services market that emerged in Oregon between the 1920s and the
1950s was not a free one. Although public statutes did not set strict rules for competition
within that market, the market was free. Instead of being guided by public statutes, the
market was ruled by a private code: the medical societies' private code of ethics.
Three factors contributed to the development of this privately-regulated market.
First, key players in the contract medicine issue gave up on the legislative process as the
means by which they could resolve their conflicts with the hospital associations. These
groups' inability to form a stable coalition against contract medicine, their lack of internal
cohesion, and the procedural rules of the Oregon state legislature contributed to the
failure of a public resolution of the issue. Second, the Oregon State Medical Society
succeeded in imposing its private code of ethics on the prepaid medical services market
in the 1930s due to its increased internal cohesion and its ability to exploit the same
legislative procedures that had previously stymied anti-hospital association efforts in the
1920s. Finally, the private sector solution was validated by the United States Supreme
Court when it determined that the medical society's unique professional status exempted
it from the rules that governed many other sectors of the private market.
In April, 2010, The Economist observed that Kaiser Permanente represented what
it termed "another American way" to the provision of health care, compared with the
United States' private fee-for-service and insurance model, or state medicine, with its
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salaried, state-employed physicians?74 Kaiser's business model, in which salaried
physicians serve as the employees of a not-for-profit business, is remarkably similar to
that ofthe hospital associations of the 1920s and 1930s. The Permanente Foundation was
one of the lucky survivors ofOSMS's anti-hospital association strategy in the 1930s and
40s. One wonders if perhaps this model would not be an anomaly, and would not inspire
such interest in the international news, had the medical societies not been so successful at
imposing their private sector strategy.
274 "Controlling Health-Care Costs: Another American Way," The Economist, April 29,
2010, p.
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APPENDIX
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION HISTORIOGRAPHY
Historians analyzing the enactment of workmen's compensation statutes
traditionally fell into two camps: materialists, including legal historian Lawrence
Friedman and sociologist Jack Ladinsky; and idealists, including William Nelson, whose
work on post-WWII accident law best exemplifies his school of thought.
Friedman and Ladinsky argued that the workmen's compensation statutes enacted
in all states between 1910 and 1948 reflected social changes that led to a broad consensus
marked by compromises between labor and capital. Charting American industrial
development through the second half of the nineteenth century, they showed that
technological and social changes eventually led to an "explosive growth of tort law,"
which could only be contained through the establishment of publicly-operated workmen's
compensation funds. The advent of the industrial revolution in the mid-nineteenth
century brought with it not only an increased use of heavy machinery, but also substantial
growth in the number of injuries suffered by the employees who worked those machines.
The existing legal system gave injured employees little recourse: under the "fellow-
servant rule," an injured employee could not sue his employer for an injury caused by the
negligence of a fellow-worker. Of course, there was little to gain in suing one's fellow
employee anyway, and injured workers fell back on their own savings or private charity.
Although draconian by twenty-first century standards, many nineteenth-century
Americans saw the fellow-servant rule as a reasonable solution to the problems of
industrial development. A rash of tort litigation against private industry would have
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stifled national and regional economic development. Furthermore, the employees who
performed the most dangerous tasks received higher compensation to offset the risks their
jobs entailed.
Two key developments converged to undermine the fellow-servant rule. First, the
rise of the contingent fee system made legal counsel available to injured workers who
otherwise could not have afforded to sue. Under this system, the lawyer received no fee
if the injured worker lost, but shared in the award if the jury found in favor of the plaintiff.
Skillful lawyers and desperate workers banded together, won a substantial number of
verdicts from sympathetic juries at the trial court level, and weakened key aspects of the
fellow-servant rule in the appellate courts. Second, railroads became the target of
popular anger. Granger legislatures passed regulations allowing injured employees to
recover against railroads, and when federal regulations replaced ineffective state laws
starting around 1887, safety rules found their way into the new codes. By 1893,
Congress declared that the railroads could no longer hold their employees responsible for
injuries incurred due to lack of proper safety equipment.
With the fellow-servant rule substantially weakened, businesses faced uncertainty
and high legal costs. These increased legal costs came at a time when businesses were
attempting to rationalize and bureaucratize their processes. However occasional, a large
verdict in favor of an injured workman dramatically interfered with a business's financial
planning efforts. Of course, injured workman benefited only marginally from the new
legal circumstances they found themselves in. Court victories were far from certain, and
successful plaintiffs were forced to split their awards with their lawyers. Perhaps at some
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point in time, Friedman and Ladinsky reasoned, the tort system lost its usefulness, and
led businessmen and laborers to pursue a new solution together. The workmen's
compensation system resulted from that cooperation.
Under the new system, an administrative agency took over the role of the court,
collected contributions to a workmen's compensation fund from employers and
employees (the employers accounted for the greater share of the contributions), and
dispensed those funds to injured workmen on the basis of well-defined statutory
schedules. The award was small, but certain. Any injury sustained "in and in the course
of employment" was compensable, even when the victim contributed to the accident
through his own negligence. Workmen's compensation was essentially a compromise:
labor gave up its chance at winning large, if only occasional, verdicts, and capital agreed
to pay the majority of the compensation costs in exchange for financial stability and
reduced legal costs. [Lawrence Friedman and Jack Ladinsky, "Social Change and the
Law ofIndustrial Accidents," Columbia Law Review, 1967, vol. 67, pp. 50-82.]
William Nelson attacked the socio-Iegal approach that Friedman and Ladinsky
took to the industrial accident problem. According to Nelson, this approach departed too
far from even the slightly risky techniques that James Willard Hurst introduced when he
chose to study not only judicial doctrines, but also "law in action" - namely, economic,
social, and cultural developments. Friedman and Ladinsky, Nelson argued, "appear to go
beyond Hurst" by treating "nineteenth century tort law as a product of judicial policy
choice among various claims presented by competing interest groups." (Nelson, 123).
Younger scholars committed even worse legal-historical sins, however, when they denied
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the influence of judge-made doctrine altogether. Their mistaken approaches, Nelson
argued, stemmed from their unwillingness to "recognize the unavailability of. .. direct
evidence to answer the admittedly important questions they want to ask... " (Nelson, 123).
Judicial opinions, Nelson believed, contained key insights that other historical sources
did not.
Because judge-made doctrine had such an important influence on policy, Nelson
reasoned, larger intellectual developments could find their way into those policies. Thus,
he argued that policy saw a shift from fairness to efficiency as the main concern in the
adjudication oftort cases, largely as an indirect result of the policies adopted by the U.S.
military establishment during WWII. During the war, the military establishment's
assertion that exercise of care could significantly reduce casualties permeated the minds
of millions of Americans, and led them in the postwar years to focus on how to deter
civilian accidents. Thus, tort law came to center around problems of efficiency: the court
would identify a socially optimal level of accidents. [William E. Nelson, "From Fairness
to Efficiency: The Transformation of Tort Law in New York, 1920-1980," Buffalo Law
Review, Vol. 47,1999, pp. 117-226.]
As an account of how intellectual factors directly influenced the enactment of
workmen's compensation statutes, Nelson's work poses some chronological problems.
Most of the current idealist interpretations of the history of tort law dance around the
workmen's compensation issue to a certain extent. Nevertheless, the theory that ideas
influenced the birth of the state-managed workmen's compensation system is a powerful
one.
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Legal historian John Fabian Witt, author of what has become the leading account
of the history of workmen's compensation statutes, agreed with Nelson that laws reflect
ideas. He also accepted Friedman's argument that law reflects social conditions. Thus,
he posited an interpretation that incorporated both idealist and materialist aspects.
Solutions to the industrial accident problem ofthe late nineteenth and early
twentieth centuries grew from American society's commitment to "free labor." Witt
wrote, "the American accident problem was deeply bound up in a peculiar set of
preoccupations borne ofthe American experience of slavery, civil war, and
emancipation." (Witt, 22). Late 19th century developments threatened to upset the free
labor ideal, but exactly how those developments did this was complicated by competing
definitions of what free labor was. Liberals were committed to a definition of free labor
centered on individual autonomy and "consensual relationships among autonomous
private actors exercising ... moral self-controL .. " (Witt, 34, internal quotation marks
removed). Labor leaders, however, viewed free labor as a commitment to worker
independence instead of individual autonomy. Free labor created the conditions under
which the economically-independent worker could exercise his democratic rights.
Managerial engineers (including Frederick Winslow Taylor) had yet another take: free
labor generated the most efficient conditions for production. Finally, social science
progressives saw free labor's benefits in its ability to preserve the "tranquility and virtue
in the domestic sphere" by protecting the home and the worker's family from the vagaries
of the marketplace. (Witt, 35).
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The structure of the new American economy in the late nineteenth century
threatened to undermine all of these ideals. Witt identified several ways in which this
occurred, but the most important was the effect that the industrial accident crisis had on
each conception of free labor. Each strand of free labor thought responded to the
accident problem in its own way. Workmen's compensation was only one ofthese
solutions, and its eventual enactment was hardly the inevitable product of material or
intellectual developments.
Witt argued that tort law offered one possible solution to the accident problem in
the liberal tradition. The reason that tort law was so effective was that it set up a barrier
between the public and private spheres preventing the intrusion of government into the
private market. The problem with this solution, however, lay in the nature of liberalism's
definition of free labor as preserving the worker's autonomy: a worker freely exercising
his rights could "generate causal ripples outside the actor's own sphere of autonomous
action." (Witt, 46). Due to the structure ofthe new workplace, an individual action could
set off an unforeseeable chain of events. This situation presented a dilemma: if the courts
continued to apply a negligence standard in adjudicating tort claims, thousands of injured
workers would be deprived of any legal remedy for actions caused through chains of
events not necessarily caused by lack of due care on the part ofthe chains' initiators. If,
on the other hand, the courts adopted a strict liability standard, holding individuals
responsible for damages caused even when they exercised reasonable care, the state
would be placed in a position whereby it invaded the private market and redistributed
resources. Ultimately, as the United States' legal elite attempted to resolve this dilemma,
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two factors emerged to undermine tort law as a solution to the accident crisis. First, a rise
in personal injury litigation "pressed harder and harder on the weaknesses in the
doctrine," exacerbating an already-apparent lack of consensus especially prevalent among
the lower courts (Witt, 51). Second, judges and scholars became increasingly aware that
classical notions of fault failed to apply exactly to the industrial accident situation of the
new economy. Ultimately, these two factors "precipitated a scramble for alternatives to
the law of torts among working-class families seeking protections against the mounting
risks of injury and death." (Witt, 70).
Workingmen's cooperatives offered another solution to the industrial accident
problem, and served labor leaders' conception of free labor as preserving the
independence of the worker. Initially, the cooperatives were successful due to the face-
to-face relationships between the workers: this allowed them to monitor other members'
behavior to deal with the adverse selection and moral hazard problems inherent to
insurance pools. Three factors, however, converged to undermine the cooperatives. First,
low-risk members ultimately fled the pools, leaving only older, higher-risk members
putting strains on the funds. Second, developments in the law of insurance contracts
harmed the cooperatives relative to commercial insurers. The latter could afford legal
counsel to face courts which began to interpret contracts against the insurer. The former
could not. Third, public perception of the cooperatives declined as fraud became rampant,
especially among cooperatives attempting to take advantage of unsuspecting immigrant
newcomers. Ultimately, Witt argued that the insurance cooperatives did not provide the
winning solution to the industrial accident problem because they failed in the private
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sector, and the state would not co-opt their structures as it did in Western Europe. The
latter path never transpired for two reasons. First, the cooperatives' leaders resisted state
regulation, largely to maintain their own positions. Second, political leaders were
preoccupied with the industrial accident problem in the earliest part of the twentieth
century, whereas the cooperatives served a much larger range of functions that the
political elite had limited interest in (Witt, 76-99).
Managerial engineers offered a solution which offered to promote efficiency in
the workplace, which scientific management saw as the primary benefit of free labor.
Witt argued that the early twentieth century definition of efficiency valued conservation.
Based on this value, managerial engineers concluded that accidents were wasteful and
inefficient, and thus needed to be prevented. By accounting for the cost of accidents
among production inputs, management promoted efficiency through incentives for
prevention. These costs were those associated with firm-specific employee accident-
compensation funds, which had the added benefit for legitimating the claims of
managerial prerogatives necessary for implementing scientific management solutions.
Witt argued that three factors converged to disadvantage the scientific management
solution. First, the courts refused to enforce contract provisions barring employees from
advancing tort claims against their employers. In other words, the courts refused to allow
the scientific management solution to supplant the classical liberal solution to the
industrial accident problem. Second, in a completely voluntary system, those firms
which adopted employee benefit funds were placed at a disadvantage compared to those
firms which refused to do so. Third, the plans were difficult to police (Witt, 110-125).
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Social scientists offered the fourth and final solution, which ultimately manifested
itself in the workmen's compensation system, and fundamentally reordered American
law and social policy. By introducing statistical thinking to the accident problem, social
scientists dragged the description of the problem away from one of direct causation
toward one which relied on aggregates and averages. Thus, by abandoning fundamental
aspects of free labor ideology and omitting individual actions from the problem statement,
workmen's compensation was able to preserve what social scientists valued most about
free labor ideology: the preservation of the family wage and the protection of the
domestic sphere (Witt, 126-151). [John Fabian Witt, The Accidental Republic: Crippled
Workingmen, Destitute Widows, and the Remaking ofAmerican Law (Cambridge:
Harvard University Press, 2004).]
Mark Aldrich convincingly suggested that Witt failed to completely strike down
the deterministic conclusions of the idealist and materialist investigations. As Witt
himself pointed out, each of the three failed options - classical tort law, cooperative
insurance, and employer relief organizations - faced its own inherent limits. Thus,
Aldrich asks us, to what extent did the enactment of workmen's compensation reflect a
free choice? Was its adoption merely dictated by the social and economic factors that
limited the other three options, and left workmen's compensation as the only remaining
solution? [Mark Aldrich, "Review of Jolm Witt, The Accidental Republic: Crippled
Workingmen, Destitute Widows, and the Remaking ofAmerican Law." EH.Net Economic
History Services, lun 11 2004. URL: http://eh.net/bookreviews/library/0794.]
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Acknowledging these potential problems in Witt's work, the account still has a
great deal of value. First, it stands for the principle that ideas have consequences.
Especially to the non-historian, pursuing solutions to current-day problems without the
benefit of hindsight, this principle is particularly compelling. Second, Witt introduced
the argument that workmen's compensation was only one of four competing solutions.
Where he fell short was in providing only a limited account of reordering processes that
followed the enactment of the fourth and final solution. As the instant paper
demonstrates, the scientific management approach to industrial accidents did not
disappear overnight. Hospital associations and contract doctors adapted to the new
workmen's compensation system in Washington and Oregon by working themselves into
the official state system, and by continuing to offer additional benefits at a small
additional cost. Likewise, fraternal benefit societies continued to hold out by advancing
legislation to exempt themselves from the regulations imposed on other groups. Both
strategies were facilitated in Oregon by the non-compulsory, non-monopolistic character
of the State Industrial Accident Fund. Alternatives to state-directed workmen's
compensation continued to exist, and the "losing" solutions continued to exploit them
until the late 1940s and early 1950s when the Oregon State Medical Society ultimately
succeeded in forcing the hospital associations out of the market for direct care.
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